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Norwegian Special Operations Forces are traditionally divided according to
their service affiliation, i.e. to the Army or Navy respectively. Transforming
these forces to be prepared for current and emerging threats has mainly
been an issue of organizational redesign, arguably for the benefit of re-
duced costs, rather than an issue of future roles and missions. This article of-
fers an alternative perspective on transformation in which organizational
design is viewed as a function of the way Special Operations Forces gene-
rally conduct missions. 
Special operations missions and tasks can broadly be categorised into di-
rect and indirect action capabilities. Direct action capabilities are those that
bring force directly into contact with the enemy. According to national and
NATO doctrine, these are special reconnaissance and direct action missions
and tasks. Indirect action capabilities are those that bring force to the ene-
my indirectly through a surrogate force, whether this is a guerrilla/insur-
gent force or a security force, a task doctrinally referred to as military
assistance. 
With respect to the future transformation of Norwegian Special Operations
Forces, this article claims that the current organizational structure, i.e.,
maintaining two separate units, should be maintained if indirect action ca-
pabilities are to be emphasized and developed as a primary capability,
which is not the case today. If special operations capabilities continue to fo-
cus on direct action capabilities, current organizational design is not neces-
sarily optimal, and a merger option is therefore relevant. ISSN 0333-3981  •  ISBN 978-82-91571-03-4  © Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies
info@ifs.mil.no – www.ifs.mil.no

Chapter 1Introduction1
Since 2001, the Norwegian Armed Forces have been undergoing one of the
most extensive transformational processes in the modern Norwegian histo-
ry.2 The latest defense review as concluded in Parliamentary Bill no. 42
(2003-2004), Den Videre Moderniseringen av Forsvaret [Continuing Mod-
ernization of the Norwegian Armed Forces], notes that transformation ini-
tiated by the previous defense review is proceeding as planned.3 The
overarching goal has been to change the Armed Forces from their threat-
based organizational structure developed during the Cold War to a
capability-based structure which can meet diffuse challenges in a new secu-
rity environment. Changed economic realities are also a major factor,
though this is outside the scope of this study. Transformation thus pervades
the entire military organization. The current challenge is first to develop a
relevant military structure within existing economic constraints,4 thus
challenging existing missions and roles as well as organizational structure.
The purpose of this study is to discuss some transformational issues
pertaining to Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF).5 I hy-
pothesize that the existing organizational structure of NORSOF is incon-
sistent with emerging roles and missions. There is no doubt that since the
mid 1990s NORSOF have been strengthened, both in terms of personnel
and equipment. However, the question to be examined here is the degree
1 This article is largely based on the author’s MA thesis from the Naval Postgraduate
School, Department of Defense Analysis, in Monterey, California. Statements in this
article are those of the author and do not reflect the view of the Norwegian Ministry
of Defense.
2 Forsvarsdepartementet, Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret i perioden 2005–2008
[Modernizing the Armed Forces 2005–2008], Parliamentary Bill no. 42 (2003-
2004), Odin (Ministry of Defense [online 20 Aug, 2005]), p. 9.
3 Ibid., 9.
4 Sverre Diesen, “Moderniseringen av Forsvaret – status og utfordringer” [Modernizing
the Armed Forces – status and challenges], Forsvarsnett, 2005 (Norwegian Defense
[online 10 Feb 2006]).
5 In this study NORSOF is used exclusively as a common term for the two tactical
units Marinejegerkommandoen (MJK) and Hærens Jegerkommando (HJK). MJK is a naval
SOF unit while HJK is an army SOF unit. The term NORSOF has no organizational
meaning beyond this. The Air Force is currently tasked to stand up a SOF-capable
helicopter unit, 137 Special Operations Air Wing. This unit is not included in the
following discussion.
8 Defence and Security Studies 1-2007to which the existing NORSOF organizational structure is consistent
with emerging roles and missions. More specifically, should the Cold
War structure, which includes a Navy and an Army special operations
component, be retained in the new defense structure? An unclassified
study on this topic seems appropriate because the latest defense reviews
emphasize the importance of special operations capabilities without nec-
essarily explaining why.
The Problem
The defense review is the process that creates the basis for a subsequent
long-term plan (3–5 years perspective) for the Norwegian Armed Forces.
The long-term plan is a proposal from the Government to the Parliament
in the form of a Stortingsproposisjon (Parliamentary Bill). Parliamentary Bill
no. 45 (2000-2001) was the basis for the long-term plan for the period
2002–2005, while Parliamentary Bill no. 42 (2003-2004) covers 2005–
2008, the current period. 
Part of the defense review comprises the Chief of Defense’s previous
recommendations to the Ministry of Defense. Defense Study 2000
[Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2000] outlined the military recommenda-
tions for the long-term plan for 2002–2005. Defense Study 2003 [Militær-
faglig utredning 2003] likewise consisted of the recommendations for the
current long-term plan. The Chief of Defense is currently processing the
next study, which covers the period 2008–2011.
Describing NORSOF, Defense Study 2000 stated that “some units
are due to their nature or special role directly subordinate to the joint
headquarters. In the proposed structure this applies to the Special Oper-
ations Forces.”6 The Chief of Defense here underscored that NORSOF
will continue to be operationally controlled by the joint level as had been
the norm more or less since 1971.7
The study also recommended NORSOF be “reorganized and ex-
panded by merging Forsvarets Spesialkommando [Norwegian Defense
Special Commando]8, Hærens Jegerkommando [Norwegian Army Spe-
cial Operations Commando], and the Marinejegerkommando [Norwe-
gian Naval Special Operations Commando]. Hærens Jegerkommando,
including Forsvarets Spesialkommando, and the Marinejegerkommando
will hereafter be abbreviated as HJK and MJK respectively. 
6 Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2000 [Defense Study 2000], Forsvarsnett (Norwegian
Defense [online 4 Dec 2006]), p. 15. 
7 See Kjell Inge Bjerga, Enhet som våpen [Unity as a weapon] (Bergen: Eide Forlag,
2002), pp. 107–112, and Forsvarets overkommando [Headquarters Defence Com-
mand], Forslag om samordning av norske spesialstyrker [coordinating Norwegian Special
Operations Forces], ref 24609/97/FO/SST/5ÅR (document automatically downgra-
ded in 2002).
8 Author’s translation. Forsvarets Spesialkommando has since its origin been an inte-
gral part of Hærens Jegerkommando.
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Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Army Operations
respectively […] The merged special operations command will,
however, be located at Rena (Army element) and Ramsund
(maritime element) respectively. The location of a joint com-
mand element will be determined at a later stage.9 
Forsvarets Spesialkommando and Hærens Jegerkommando represent the
same unit, as will be shown later. Rena and Ramsund are where HJK and
MJK were located before Defense Study 2000 was initiated. 
The subsequent political process did not follow the Chief of Defense’s
recommendations. Parliamentary Bill no. 45 (2000-2001) stated that
Norwegian Special Operations Forces should “continue to be located with
their Army element at Rena and the maritime element at Ramsund.”10
However, the Parliamentary Bill did not comment on the more ambitious
issue of merging the units or the proposed joint command element. 
Defense Study 2003 went further than the previous study on several
points. It stated that 
NORSOF are strategic assets offering a flexible capability to
meet shifting challenges concerning territorial defense, uphold-
ing national sovereignty, preventing or combating terrorism,
and as participants in Allied or other peace-support or peace-
enforcing operations. NORSOF can also support national police
during their operations to prevent or combat terrorism.11 
The study also argued for strengthening NORSOF to adapt to NATO
and national requirements, “primarily to expand the national freedom of
action, flexibility, and sustainability. Increasing this capability will en-
sure a more robust professional environment, better interoperability, and
ability to sustain operations over time.”12
On the organizational issue, the study recommended a new joint
commander be established, acting as “Chief of Defense’s advisor in special
operation issues, directly subordinate to the Chief of Defense.”13 Subordi-
nating NORSOF to the military strategic level was new in the organiza-
tional structure and signaled a break with existing traditions.
9 Forsvarssjefens Forsvarsstudie 2000, p. 15.
10 Forsvarsdepartementet, Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005 [Changing the
Armed Forces 2002–2005], Parliamentary Bill no. 45 (2000-2001), para 5.3.4
(Ministry of Defense [online 11 Dec 2006]).
11 Forsvaret, “Forsvarssjefens Militærfaglige Utredning 2003” [Defense Study 2003],
Forsvarsnett (Norwegian Defense [online 26 Aug 2005]), p. 11.
12 Forsvarssjefens militærfaglige utredning 2003, p. 11.
13 Ibid.
10 Defence and Security Studies 1-2007Addressing the tactical units HJK and MJK, Defense Study 2003
recommended NORSOF be organized as a joint formation called For-
svarets Jegerkommando. This formation was to be “based on joint basic
training adapted for a more flexible and cross-trained unit in a longer per-
spective, where the subunits can rotate on tasks and readiness, as well as
represent complementary capabilities in large-scale operations.”14 On the
location issue, the study concluded that “operational aspects support
maintaining […] FSK/HJK […] at Rena [….] The maritime element
(MJK) will until further notice be located at Ramsund.”15 
Parliamentary Bill no. 42 (2005-2008) concurred with Defense
Study 2003 on most points, restating NORSOF’s strategic relevance, the
necessity of adapting to NATO and national requirements, while empha-
sizing jointness in a national and international setting. The Parliamentary
Bill did not explicitly follow up the joint commander initiative, only stat-
ing that 
[i]t is necessary to strengthen capabilities at the Chief of
Defense level. It is also necessary to increase Special Operations
Forces (SOF) manning at the National Joint Headquarters
(NJHQ), in order to improve Chief NJHQ’s ability to command
special operation units when he assumes command authority.16
On jointness, the Parliamentary Bill stated that NORSOF “must be able
to work as a single unit. The units [HJK and MJK] are subordinate to
their respective services with regard to force production, and force pro-
duction is supposed to be coordinated when feasible and cost-effective.”17
On the location issue, the Parliamentary Bill was identical to Defense
Study 2003 with the exception that the wording until further notice had
been removed. Whether this is semantics or politics can certainly be ar-
gued. Within the forces themselves, semantics certainly matter.
The two defense studies did, however, indicate that there were polit-
ical and military differences on the future development of NORSOF. De-
fense Study 2000 explicitly used the word merge to describe its view of the
future organization of the tactical units MJK and HJK. The study did not
take a firm stance with regard to how to reorganize the command struc-
ture. However, it did recommend that Norwegian Special Operations
Forces be subordinate to the operational level headquarters to be estab-
lished in Stavanger. The subsequent Parliamentary Bill no. 45 did not ex-
press anything about reorganizing the organizational structure, thus
implying no change to the command structure. 
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Forsvarsdepartementet, Den videre moderniseringen …, p. 56, author’s translation.
17 Ibid.
Making New Ambitions Work 11Defense Study 2003 did not use the word merge; rather, the term joint
formation was employed to describe the proposed, new NORSOF organi-
zation. It recommended establishing a joint commander for the joint for-
mation, subordinate to the Chief of Defense; i.e., the new formation should
be subordinate to the military strategic level. It also highlighted which
capabilities or potential roles NORSOF should uphold as a collective en-
tity. Both defense studies recommended a continuation of force produc-
tion within the Army and Navy respectively. Parliamentary Bill no. 42
did not follow suit on the joint commander issue. It stated that the tacti-
cal level should remain organized as it already was, i.e., as separate units.
Today, both units continue to be organized as they were before Defense
Study 2000 recommended a change.
Recapturing the Transformation Process
At the tactical level within NORSOF as an organization, the merge/not
merge issue has, regardless of the interpretation of official documents,
been a core issue for years. For MJK, being the smaller of the two units
defined here as NORSOF, the two latest defense reviews were perceived
as a question of to be or not to be.18 Whether this is a rational perception is
irrelevant. A study into organizational behavior and transformation
might give some answers, though this is not the purpose of this study.
Rather, I would claim that the current transformational process started off
at the wrong end, and without a consistent or relevant framework to
guide the process. The above seems to show clearly that the
transformation of Norwegian Special Operations Forces has focused more
on organizational issues than on what is arguably the more challenging
task, which is to define future roles and missions. The easy way around
this issue has comprised proposing dual capabilities for both units with-
out specifying tasks beyond the doctrinal level. This method violates the
principles of transformation as shall be discussed in the final part of this
study. 
One framework with which to address future transformation of spe-
cial operations forces is proposed by Christopher Lamb, former director of
US Policy Planning at the Office for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.19 According to Lamb, the
following criteria should be used when discussing Special Operations
Forces’ roles and missions in the aftermath of the Cold War:
1. The nature of the security threat and the anticipated nature 
of the future security environment
18 Participant observation.
19 Christopher Lamb, “Perspectives on Emerging SOF Roles and Missions”, Special War-
fare (July 1995): 2–9. 
12 Defence and Security Studies 1-20072. The security strategy adopted to deal with the changed envi-
ronment
3. The nature of the forces themselves
Although Lamb proposes this framework as a means to develop US Spe-
cial Operations Forces units, there are no apparent impediments to using
the same framework as a starting point from which to discuss NORSOF’s
future roles and missions. Although other frameworks could certainly be
applied, such as NATO requirements or correspondence with comparable
European nations, Lamb’s suggestion has several advantages. First, de-
fense planning is a question of national needs and requirements. For a
small nation, the Alliance’s requirements certainly apply, as exemplified
by commitments made by NATO’s members in Prague in 2002.20 But
defense planning by international consensus has not so far significantly
transcended national requirements. Standardization of forces, whether in
terms of size or capability, is arguably still one of NATO’s greatest chal-
lenges. Norway’s newly commissioned Nansen-class Frigates illustrate
the purchasing of a combat platform whose primary role, anti-submarine
warfare, is not in demand in NATO. Likewise, purchasing new airplanes
to replace an ageing fleet of F-16s is not a NATO project. At best, it is a
joint effort by a few nations, arguably for the benefit of reduced costs rath-
er than any operational effect. It is unlikely, therefore, that the transfor-
mation of strategic assets such as special operations forces will be a joint
effort within NATO. 
An extensive comparison with other nations is arguably most feasible
for tactical reasons. Standardizing techniques, tactics, and procedures of
special forces in NATO could certainly be improved. This study, howev-
er, will not deal with standardization at the tactical level, although it is
of importance to the transformation of NORSOF, as will be discussed be-
low. The questions raised in this study will instead focus on Norwegian
Special Operations Forces’ potential and utility as a national asset.
Norway’s national requirements for strategic special operations can hard-
ly be compared for instance with British ones. Tactically, Norwegian
units can certainly operate in the same physical environment as their Brit-
ish counterparts, but strategically this is not so, because of the national
differences in foreign policy agendas, military traditions, and in the inte-
gration of the military as an instrument of statecraft. 
20 For information on the current transformation of NATO, including the Prague Capa-
bilities Commitment, see NATO’s website. 
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Based on Lamb’s framework, this study has been organized to address four
questions:
1. What are the traditional roles and missions of NORSOF?
2. What is the nature of the security environment and per-
ceived future threats?
3. Which are the most interesting national strategic alterna-
tives in the new environment?
4. What should be the future roles and mission of NORSOF?
Of particular importance, in Lamb’s view, is the nature of the mission: 
If Special Operations Forces are asked to conduct missions con-
trary to their current nature, they eventually will evolve into
different types of forces. The risks inherent in such change is
that SOF might duplicate capabilities that already exist in other
forces and that they would be unable to effectively conduct tra-
ditional special-operations missions.21 
The second chapter will start with a rather comprehensive discussion of
the topic special operations to provide the study with a conceptual frame-
work and establishing a common system of concepts. Current doctrines,
national as well as Allied and US, will be examined along with existing
literature on the subject. In the second part of the chapter the first ques-
tion will be addressed specifically, i.e., what are the traditional roles and
missions of NORSOF. I shall commence this analysis by examining na-
tional special operations traditions that were established during World
War II and the Cold War. Finally, I shall capture the essence of what has
occurred within this field since 1990.
In chapter 3 current and future threats will be focused on to define
the types of conflicts or threats that may generate roles and missions in
the future. National strategies to deal with future threats will also be dis-
cussed in this chapter. Although no coherent military strategy exists, his-
torical and existing practice, along with recent political statements,
indicate the military’s role as an instrument of state power. In chapter 3
the second and third questions will be answered: What is the nature of
the security environment and perceived future threats, and which are the
most interesting national strategic alternatives in the new environment?
In chapter 4 the last question will be addressed: What should be the
future roles and missions of NORSOF? New roles and missions will be
suggested. The discussion is confined to the operational and strategic lev-
el; tactical level missions are by and large not discussed, as whether HJK
21 Lamb, “Perspectives …”: 2.
14 Defence and Security Studies 1-2007should have rubber boats or which vehicles MJK ought to have is not im-
portant here. More crucial is a conceptual clarification of roles in accord-
ance with doctrinal terms. The chapter concludes with recommendations
on the future transformation of NORSOF. 
On Literature
The principal method used to answer these questions consists of review-
ing existing doctrine, literature, and practice. National and NATO doc-
trines, Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine and Allied Joint Publication 1
are an essential part in this examination. Apart from during World War
II, references to current NORSOF history are but sparse. Erling Krange,
a former Navy frogman, has published a book on Norwegian Naval div-
ing which includes a partial description of the early history of MJK. To
my knowledge, no similar publication is available on HJK apart from
what may be found on the Norwegian Armed Forces’ web pages. 
Due to recent international deployments beginning in the mid-
1990s, MJK and HJK have become increasingly visible in the national
media. Much of the information that is released today would have been
classified ten years ago. Tactical information on the units themselves is
still protected from public access, and rightly so. However, no reference
exists to NORSOF as part of a national strategy except as a relevant and
competent niche capability for NATO which may seem odd from a stra-
tegic perspective.22 
Internationally, literature on special operations forces is more exten-
sive. Most of it concerns historical anecdotes from tactical battles or the
story of the tactical units themselves. Interestingly, tactical information
on MJK and HJK has become more widely available thanks to interna-
tional literature.23 Less has been published on special operations forces’
strategic utility. Eliot Cohen and Colin Gray, both noted strategists and
defense analysts, are cited in this study due to their contributions on spe-
cial operations forces and strategy. Lucien Vandenbroucke is cited for his
evaluation of special operations forces as an instrument of US foreign pol-
icy in a book he wrote while working for the US State Department. Much
of the relevant literature is fairly new, as before 1990 special operations
forces in general had a mixed reputation. After all, conventional strategy,
based on doctrines of attrition, dominated the Cold War. This is a stra-
tegy unfavorable to the nature of special operations forces. The mixed rep-
utation especially applies to US Special Operations Forces after Vietnam,
22 Forsvarsdepartementet, “Relevant Force: Strategic Concept for the Norwegian Armed
Forces”, Odin, 2005 (Ministry of Defense [online 21 Aug 2005]), p. 73–74.
23 For example, see Leroy Thompson, The Rescuers: The World’s Top Anti-Terrorist Units
(Boulder, Co: Paladin Press, 1986), pp. 90–91, and Ross S. Kelly, Special Operations
and National Purpose, Issues in Low-Intensity Conflict Series (Lexington, Mass:
Lexington Books, 1989), p. 66–69.
Making New Ambitions Work 15documented for instance by Thomas K. Adams while serving as Director
of Intelligence and Special Operations in the US Army Peacekeeping In-
stitute. The British experience is arguably different, as the British suc-
cessfully utilized their special operations forces in post-colonial conflicts
throughout the Cold War era.24 However, less has been written about the
British Special Operations Forces’ strategic utility compared to the US
tradition. Overall, the bulk of the literature describing special operations
forces’ role in a strategic context is influenced by US traditions and expe-
riences.
The end of the Cold War witnessed an upsurge of interest in special
operations forces and their applicability in “small wars.” This has resulted
in increased interest in the strategic use of special operations forces and a
corresponding increase in articles on the subject. Although tactical stories
still constitute the majority of published books, increasing numbers of
relevant articles are being published in military journals and by research
institutes. Again, the articles are heavily influenced by US experiences
and the lessons learned. 
The dominance of literature showing US influence might initially
seem to make a scholarly approach, and hence its conclusions, less relevant
to a small nation like Norway. The US Special Operations Forces commu-
nity constitutes more than twice the number of the Norwegian Armed
Forces in total. However, as the Norwegian Armed Forces increasingly fo-
cus on international operations, certain common principles, whether tac-
tical or strategic, still apply. NATO doctrine resembles US doctrine in
many ways, especially with regard to special operations forces. The small
nation’s dilemma, however, is how to utilize these lessons for national
purposes. 
24 There are numerous accounts of UK SOF’s tactical employments after World War II.
See, for example, Robin Neillands, In the Combat Zone: Special Forces Since 1945 (Lon-
don: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997).

Chapter 2NORSOF: Traditional Roles
and Mission
The first part of this chapter explores special operations and special oper-
ations forces (SOF) in a national context. Existing doctrine is reviewed to
create a basis with which to understand special operations in general. Ex-
isting literature on the subject is used to broaden and highlight alterna-
tive perspectives. The last part of the chapter explores the national
tradition with regard to special operations and special operations forces.
Doctrine: A Theoretical Framework
Doctrine consists of fundamental principles pertaining to the develop-
ment and use of military forces. Its central task is to describe the basis for
military activity, provide normative guidelines, and describe the capabil-
ities needed to execute the doctrine. Doctrinal guidelines are not absolute,
but rather strong recommendations. It is essential that doctrine change as
required by security and defense policy and technological evolution. Ac-
cordingly, doctrine is only useful as a tool to the degree the future corre-
lates with the past.25 
Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine is the central doctrinal document of
the Norwegian military and is divided into parts A and B. Operational
principles, including special operations, are described in part B. Part A
contains broad strategic considerations. There is no separate national doc-
trine for special operations forces.
National doctrine is harmonized with NATO’s doctrine.26 Central to
NATO’s doctrine is Allied Joint Publications-1, or AJP-01. Both the na-
tional doctrine and NATO doctrine have various subordinated service-
25 Forsvarets overkommando, Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine Del A – Grunnlag [Joint
Doctrine Part A – General] (Oslo, 2000), p. 13–15.
26 Ibid., ch. 1.5.1 and 1.5.2.
18 Defence and Security Studies 1-2007based doctrines. Table 1 illustrates the relationship between the Norwe-
gian and NATO doctrines.27
Chapter 15 of the national doctrine, Spesialoperasjoner [special operations],
is a translation of NATO’s AJP-01(B) Chapter 8, Special Operations.
Hence, on this topic, national doctrine does not reflect national adapta-
tion to any extent. 
Special Operations Forces and Special Operations: Definitions
Defining special operations and special operations forces (SOF) are impor-
tant for functional purposes. Colin Gray asserts that “it is imperative to
define special operations, but there is peril in the exercise.”28 One defini-
tion may, according to Gray, be either “so vague and inclusive as to pro-
vide no meaningful guidance or so rigid and focused as to risk inhibiting
the imagination of special operations forces themselves and of their polit-
ical and military clients.”29 
John Arquilla, senior lecturer at the Department of Defense Analysis,
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, defines special opera-
tions as “that class of military (or paramilitary) actions that fall outside the
realm of conventional warfare during their respective time periods.”30
Such a broad definition is, according to Arquilla, required to study the
history of special operations:
This definition, while capturing the essential spirit of special
operations, avoids some of the problems posed by requiring that
they be performed by “specially trained, equipped, and organ-
National NATO
National Joint Doctrine (FFOD part A and B) Allied Joint Operations Doctrine (AJP-01)
Operations (AJP-3)
Doctrine for 
Land 
Operations
Doctrine for 
Naval 
Operations
Doctrine for 
Air 
Operations
Land 
Operations
Maritime 
and 
Amphibious 
Operations
Air and 
Space 
Operations
Table 1: Structural resemblance between Norway and NATO’s doctrines (after 
Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine (part A))
27 Ibid., p. 18, table 1.1.
28 Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1996), p.
144.
29 Ibid.
30 John Arquilla (ed.), From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times
(Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 1996), p. xv–xvi.
Making New Ambitions Work 19ized” forces, or that they must fall into the category of the one-
shot coup de main. Instead many special operations are prosecuted
by regular forces doing quite exceptional things. Nevertheless,
on many occasions, raiders constitute a de facto elite attack force,
as can be seen by the great warriors chosen to ride in the Trojan
Horse, or in the rigorous training and distinctive attire of Rog-
ers Rangers.31
Following Arquilla’s definition, a special operation is then a military or
paramilitary operation executed outside the realm of what is conceived as
conventional warfare at a particular time. 
Christopher Lamb circumvents the problem of defining special oper-
ations forces by stating “that they are what conventional forces are not.”32
Conventional forces are normally thought of as forces organized, trained,
and equipped to defeat other conventional forces in battles. According to
Ross Kelly, former Senior Analyst at the US Defense Intelligence Agency,
[t]he thrust of conventional force training … is the achievement
of consistent performance of routine tasks to the highest attain-
able standard. By contrast, the emphasis in special operations is
on directing individual skills to the accomplishment of func-
tions unique to a given mission, generally a high-risk one.
Improvisation and independent thinking are essential.33
Following Kelly, a significant difference between conventional forces and
special operations forces is the latter’s emphasis on individual skills and
the ability to perform unique missions. This is the central argument for
claiming that the scope of conventional units is specialization, while spe-
cial operations forces are more general in nature. Kelly claims that special
operations “address a spectrum of challenges not normally considered ap-
propriate for regular armed military or national forces.”34 What is appro-
priate or not can certainly be argued. One traditional distinction is special
operations forces’ role as a military component operating independently
in enemy controlled territory – behind enemy lines. 
NATO does not define the term ‘special operations force’. However,
it does define special operations as:
Military activities conducted by specially designated, organised,
trained and equipped forces using operational techniques and
modes of employment not standard to conventional forces.
31 Ibid.
32 Lamb, “Perspectives …”: 3.
33 Kelly, Special Operations …, p. xvii.
34 Ibid., xvi.
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operations (peace, crisis and conflict) independently or in co-
ordination with operations of conventional forces to achieve
military, political, economic and psychological objectives or a
combination thereof. Political-military considerations may
require covert or discreet techniques and the acceptance of a
degree of physical and political risk not associated with conven-
tional operations.35
AJP-1(B) defines the range of military operations which NATO’s Special
Operations Forces can undertake. However, NATO’s definition might re-
quire some clarification. First, it states that special operations forces use
operational techniques and modes of employment not standard to con-
ventional forces. To a certain extent this is correct. However, there are few
operational techniques unique to special operations forces as such, as Gray
points out.36 Where NATO’s definition emphasizes the ability to employ
unique skills to distinguish special operations from conventional opera-
tions, Tugwell and Charter use the term unorthodox.37 Unorthodox in
this context must be understood as referring to methods and techniques
rather than skills. It is the “quantity and intensity or level of skills re-
quired of each man or very small group” that make the significant differ-
ence, not necessarily the set of skills itself.38 The well-known Special
Operations Executive’s operation against the heavy water plant at Rjukan
(a location presumably crucial to Germany’s nuclear program) in 1943
did not necessarily involve particular skills exclusive to special operations
forces. Rather, a combination of personal skills, initiative, rigorous train-
ing, and the ability to improvise made this operation a success. 
The spectrum of conflict is defined as a scale with “peace” at one end
and “armed conflict” at the other. Somewhere in between is “crisis”.
“Armed conflict” includes “war”, a term used in national doctrine. In a
post-Cold War scenario, this must be interpreted as the spectrum of con-
flict in the area of operation. This point might seem obsolete, but the dis-
tinction is important because “war” is a negative word in comparison to
the arguably more neutral term “operations”. This became clear during
NATO’s air campaign in Kosovo in 1999, when the Norwegian Prime
35 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(B) (NATO, 2002), section 8.1. Forsvarets Felles-
operative Doktrine explicitly states this is the definition used in national doctrine. See
Forsvarets Overkommando, Forsvarets Fellesoperative Doktrine Del B – Operasjoner [Joint
Doctrine Part B – Operations] (Oslo, 2000), p. 203.
36 Gray, Explorations in Strategy, p. 146.
37 Ibid., p. 145. Tugwell and Charter define Special Operations as “[s]mall-scale, clan-
destine, covert or overt operations of an unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature,
undertaken to achieve significant political or military objects in support of foreign
policy.” 
38 Ibid., p. 146.
Making New Ambitions Work 21Minister, Kjell Magne Bondevik, refuted that Norwegian F-16 pilots
were engaged in war, claiming they were rather “part of a restricted mil-
itary campaign.”39 To wrongly interpret the level of conflict is likely to
result in misuse of military power including the misuse of special opera-
tions forces. On the individual level, a conflict or operation is often per-
ceived as nothing less than war. 
A feature arguably pertaining more than anything to the particular
image of special operations is their association with covert and clandestine
operations. The term “covert” is frequently used to describe a mode of op-
eration hidden from the enemy. Although this captures the general idea
of the term, it is too vague to capture the essence of a covert special opera-
tion. NATO uses the terms “discreet” and “covert” to describe the modes
of operations, while national doctrine use the terms “discreet”, “covert”
and “clandestine”. For the purpose of this study, the terms covert, clan-
destine, and overt will be used exclusively: 
• A covert operation conceals its sponsor, i.e., the authorizing agency 
does not take responsibility whether the operation succeeds or not. 
• A clandestine operation conceals its existence, i.e. mission success 
hinges on the ability to keep planning and execution secret. The 
sponsor will, however, normally claim responsibility upon comple-
tion. 
• An overt operation neither denies its nature nor its sponsor. 
A special operation can be any of these types, as well as a combination of
the covert and clandestine.40 
However, there are organizational and technical, as well as moral and
constitutional implications, to the conduct of covert operations. Discuss-
ing the legal implications of snatching Osama Bin Laden in a covert op-
eration involving US Special Operations Forces in 1993, Vice President
Al Gore remarked to President Bill Clinton that “[o]f course it’s a viola-
tion of international law, that’s why it’s a covert action.”41 Using this def-
inition, covert operations are necessarily associated with high political
risk for their sponsors. This is also reflected in NATO’s definition. With-
out this understanding of risk and risk management at the political level,
Norwegian Special Operations Forces might not be utilized at maximum
capacity. This will be discussed below.
39 Halvor Elvik, “Ord om krig” [Words on War], Dagbladet, 23 June 1999 [online 9 Sep
2005]. Prime Minister Bondevik later admitted that the pilots had participated in a
war.
40 Gray, Explorations in Strategy, p. 146.
41 Cited in Richard A. Clarke, Against all Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (New
York: Free Press, 2004), p. 144.
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from executing special operations. It is not unthinkable that a submarine
can conduct missions or tasks covered by NATO’s existing definition.
Special operations aviation units do fly special operation missions, argua-
bly following Arquilla’s definition more than NATO’s. Following
Arquilla, the issue is whether the mission or operation is done in accord-
ance with conventional warfighting principles (maneuver and concentra-
tion) or not.
Special Operations Missions
NATO defines three principal special operations tasks: Special Surveil-
lance and Reconnaissance, Direct Action, and Military Assistance. 
“Special reconnaissance complements national and allied intelligence
collection assets in the Area of Intelligence interests and systems by ob-
taining specific, well defined, and time-sensitive information of strategic
or operational significance.”42 
Special reconnaissance includes area assessment, advance force opera-
tions, target acquisition, early warning on enemy forces concentration,
movement, command and control, and intelligence on critical infrastruc-
ture in denied territory. This list is not exhaustive, and neither should it
be. However, the emphasis on intelligence collection of operational or
military-strategic value is of special importance. 
Direct Action is normally thought of as small-scale offensive raids with
operational or military-strategic goals. “[Direct Action] operations are
normally limited in scope and duration, and usually incorporate a planned
withdrawal from the immediate objective area.”43 The World War II
British X-craft attacks on the battleship Tirpitz in Altafjord and the raid
on the heavy-water plant at Rjukan are both examples of raids with mil-
itary-strategic goals. The time factor associated with planning these op-
erations is not necessarily limited, as both missions took months and years
to plan and develop. But once initiated, they were clearly both of short
duration and limited scope. A more recent and unorthodox example of di-
rect action capabilities was the initial phase of the US invasion in
Afghanistan in 2001, where US Special Operations Forces units embed-
ded in the advancing Northern Alliance provided terminal guidance for
the Air Force. 
Military Assistance is the third principal special operations task. 
Special operations may include the requirement to provide Mil-
itary Assistance (MA) to friendly or allied forces in peace, crisis
and conflict. This assistance can be provided directly or indi-
42  NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(B), 8-2.
43  Ibid., 8-3.
Making New Ambitions Work 23rectly to a designated friendly force or to an indigenous military
or para-military force to protect their democratic society from
subversion, lawlessness or insurgency.44
Military Assistance encompasses support to peace operations by 
providing immediate technical advice and assistance in organi-
zation, planning, intelligence, command and control, health
service, engineering and security, during humanitarian crisis or
disaster relief. Facilitating, using cultural and language skills, a
co-ordinated, multinational approach to conflict resolution
through liaison teams.45 
At this point, national doctrine does reflect a change compared to NATO
doctrine, as national doctrine states that military assistance “is most often
conducted by special operations forces from other countries …”46
The term unconventional is often used to explain types of operations
that fall outside the realm of conventional warfare. Unconventional War-
fare (UW) has, however, a narrower and more explicit definition. Accord-
ing to the US doctrine for Joint Special Operations, unconventional
warfare is defined as: 
operations that involve a broad spectrum of military and
paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predomi-
nantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate
forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and
directed in varying degree by an external source … UW
[Unconventional warfare] military activity represents the cul-
mination of a successful effort to organize and mobilize the civil
populace against a hostile government or occupying power …
SOF units do not create resistance movements. They advise,
train, and assist indigenous resistance movements already in
existence to conduct UW and when required, accompany them
into combat.47 
Unconventional warfare is one of the nine core tasks for US Special Oper-
ations Forces. This specific task is first of all connected in its present form
to the US army special forces. Established in 1952, 10th Special Forces
Group was primarily intended to operate in denied territory, first of all
44 Ibid., 8-4.
45 Ibid., 8-4.
46 Forsvarets overkommando, Forsvarets Fellesoperative … del B, p. 206.
47 US Joint Chief of Staff, JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations Forces, 17 Decem-
ber 2003 (Defense Technical Information Center [online 5 Dec 2006]), p. II-7–II-8. 
24 Defence and Security Studies 1-2007behind the Iron Curtain separating Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
from Western Europe. The concept of operation was partly based on
World War II experiences of partisan warfare. The concept of unconven-
tional warfare and the link to the US Special Forces continued to develop
during the Vietnam War, primarily at the initiative of US President
Kennedy.48 As a military technique, however, unconventional warfare
was never held in high esteem by the conventional side of the US army,
partly because it did not fit with what was regarded as the correct way of
defeating the enemy.49 
The other eight special operations tasks defined by US doctrine are:
Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Foreign Internal Defense,
Counterterrorism, Counterproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Civil Affairs Operations, Psychological Operations, and Information Op-
erations. 
Direct action and special reconnaissance are more or less identical with
NATO’s direct action and special surveillance and reconnaissance. Foreign
internal defense is, in its simplest explanation, complementary to uncon-
ventional warfare. The focus is on “action programs taken by another gov-
ernment or other designated organization, to free and protect its society
from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency ... the goal is to enable these
forces to maintain the HN’s [host nation] internal stability …”50 Counter-
terrorism consists of “operations that include the offensive measures to pre-
vent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.”51 Counterproliferation of
weapons of mass destruction “refers to actions taken to locate, seize, destroy,
render safe, capture, or recover WMD [weapons of mass destruction].”52
Civil affairs operations are those operations supporting civil-military oper-
ations, where civil affairs activities can include “establishing and conduct-
ing a military government or civil administration within operational
areas until civilian authority or government can be restored or transi-
tioned to other appropriate authorities.”53 The first seven tasks do, in my
view, find their equivalent in NATO’s tasks. 
In principle, US doctrine resembles NATO’s when it comes to special
operations tasks, arguably with the exception of Psychological Operations
and Information Operations, which are not special operations forces tasks
within the Alliance. Table 2 lists NATO’s three tasks and the corre-
48 Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconven-
tional Warfare (London; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998), ch. 3.
49 Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MA: The John Hopkins
University Press, 1986).
50 US Joint Chief of Staff, JP 3-05 …, p. II-7 
51 Ibid., II-9.
52 Ibid., p. II-10
53 Ibid., p. II-10
Making New Ambitions Work 25sponding US tasks, psychological operations and information operations
exluded.
Neither US nor NATO doctrine says anything about service-based mis-
sions or roles, i.e. whether there are characteristics, requirements, roles, or
missions that distinguish the army, navy, or air force’s SOFs. One expla-
nation for this might be that doctrine is developed based on a conceptual
understanding of the forces themselves, i.e. how the forces have developed
within their respective services throughout history. Although one might
claim that unorthodox or unconventional warfighting techniques are as
old as warfighting itself, the creation of special operations forces as a warf-
ighting component is a modern invention. Doctrine can therefore only of-
fer general guidelines for the continuing development of Norwegian
Special Operations Forces. 
Literature and common parlance often separate special operations’
modus operandi into the commando role and the unconventional warfare
role. Unconventional in this context resembles the unconventional war-
fare task defined by US doctrine. The idea is that special operations con-
sist of an offensive and a defensive component. 
Lamb and David Tucker, Associate Professor at the Department of
Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, California, offer a slightly
different framework to explain this difference. They claim there are two
principal modes in which special operations forces accomplish their tasks:
the direct action approach, which brings force directly into contact with
the enemy, and the indirect action approach, which brings force to the en-
emy indirectly through a surrogate force. The essential idea is that there
are distinct capabilities that separate the two approaches.54 Assuming
that direct action and special surveillance and reconnaissance are the more
offensive of NATO’s three tasks, and that conversely military assistance is
NATO, 
incl. Norway
Special Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance 
Direct Action Military Assistance
US
Special Reconnais-
sance
Direct Action, Counter-
terrorism, Counter-
proliferation of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction
Foreign Internal Defense, 
Unconventional Warfare, 
Civil Affairs Operations
Table 2: Comparison of Special Operations tasks according to NATO and US doctrine
54 David Tucker and Christopher J. Lamb, “Restructuring Special Operations Forces for
Emerging Threats”, Strategic Forum, no. 219 (January 2006) (Swiss Federal Institute
of Technology Zurich [online 24 Jan 2007]): 1–6.
26 Defence and Security Studies 1-2007the more defensive task, doctrinal tasks could then be reorganized and un-
derstood according to Table 3. 55
This framework will be used in the following to explain special operations
forces’ principal modes of operation. 
Special Operations Missions with Strategic Objectives
Special operations in support of strategic objectives do not initially re-
quire a separate definition. The topic does, however, require clarification
to fully understand the broader context of such missions. Current defini-
tions do not exclude this type of special operations per se, but using them
for military-strategic or political-strategic purposes is far more controver-
sial than the operational-level operations normally found in military cam-
paigns.
As per NATO’s doctrine, “SOF may be employed in support of the
Alliance’s military-strategic objectives and operational objectives as di-
rected by the JFC [Joint Force Commander].”56 In NATO operations and
exercises, special operations forces are normally used as an operational lev-
el asset. NATO’s definition of special operations also addresses political
implications and political risk. To what extent NATO has the authority
to pursue objectives other than military ones, is questionable. The polit-
ical risk involved in a NATO operation is collectively divided within the
Alliance and hence mitigated to a level where national interests are hardly
at stake. Covert special operations using the definition above are therefore
more applicable as a tool for the nation state as such than they are for the
Alliance as a whole. It is unlikely that Norway would conduct a covert
special operation pursuing national strategic objectives within an Alli-
ance context where consensus is required. 
Direct Action Capabilities
Indirect Action 
Capabilities
NATO, 
incl Norway
Special Surveillance and Reconnaissance, 
Direct Action
Military Assistance
US
Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action, 
Counterterrorism, Counterproliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Foreign Internal Defense, 
Unconventional Warfare, Civil 
Affairs Operations
Table 3: Doctrinal tasks separated in Direct Action and Indirect Action Capabilities
55 From a US perspective, the two tasks Psychological Operations and Information
Operations would fall into the indirect action capabilities category.
56 NATO, AJP-1(B), p. 8-1.
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Vandenbroucke defines these as strikes which seek “to achieve major for-
eign policy aims rather than just tactical objectives … These are secret
military or paramilitary strikes, approved at the highest level of the U.S.
government after detailed review.”57 Vandenbroucke claims that strategic
special operations support political rather than military objectives, so
tight political control is required. One could argue that the political level
at any time has the necessary control over the military as an institution.
Strategic special operations are, however, initiated, controlled, and exe-
cuted under specific and tight political supervision. 
Vandenbroucke’s definition is narrow, and focuses exclusively on di-
rect action operations. His case studies specifically include toppling for-
eign regimes (Bay of Pigs, 1961) and hostage rescue operations (Son Tay,
1970 and the Iran rescue attempt, 1980). To qualify as a strategic special
operation, the operation must support a foreign policy crisis. Hence po-
litical monitoring of planning and execution is required beyond what is
considered normal for military operations.58 
There might be more to strategic special operations than offensive
strikes in support of a foreign policy crisis; military assistance could in-
clude operations through its definition that could be perceived as sup-
porting foreign policy. Paul de B. Taillon, Director, Review and Military
Liaison, Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commis-
sioner in Canada, asserts in a concept paper published at the Joint Special
Operations University in Florida that special operations forces are one of
Canada’s two strategic assets, intelligence being the other, because 
[t]he future employment of CANSOF [Canadian Special Opera-
tions Forces], as a training asset to assist friendly nations, could
ensure high-quality training while, at the same time, extending
and leveraging Canadian foreign policy and interests and influ-
ence abroad.59
Taillon’s assertion might very well be true, but might not the same effect
be achieved with conventional assets? An extended conventional bilateral
training program initially seems just as likely to achieve the same foreign
57 Lucien S. Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options: Special Operations as an Instrument of U.S.
Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 4. Vandenbrouche
emphasizes the unconventional application of force to differentiate strategic special
operations from conventional strikes in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives. The
latter is exemplified by the 1986 air strike against Libya. Unconventional special
operations are exemplified by the Bay of Pigs (1961), the Son Tay raid (1970), and the
attempt to rescue US hostages in Iran (1980). The latter eventually led to a reorgani-
zation of US SOF chain of command and the emergence of USSOCOM in 1986. 
58 Ibid., p. ix.
59 J. Paul de B. Taillon, The Evolving Requirements of the Canadian Special Operations Forces:
A Future Concept Paper (Hurlburt Field, FL: Joint Special Operations University,
2005), p. 3.
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trolled beyond what is considered required for a strategic strike. If one ac-
cepts that a strategic special operation implies political risk and is
narrowed to the responsibility of the nation state, Vandenbroucke’s defi-
nition thus seems more plausible than Taillon’s. If this is not so, then all
training and exchange programs are strategic by nature. Hence in a na-
tional perspective, a strategic special operation could be defined as a cov-
ert or clandestine direct action operation in support of Norwegian foreign
policy objectives, approved at the highest governmental level. 
Conducting strategic operations requires contact between the special
operations forces and the relevant military and political authorities.
Without close contact, special operations for strategic purposes are histor-
ically not likely to be an option for policymakers. This observation stems
from the US experience and literature on this topic. It is commonly
known that special operations forces were not held in high esteem by the
conventional military leadership after the Vietnam War. The US special
operations forces community was collectively downsized after 1974, as it
was after the Second World War. This downsizing reached a culmination
in the catastrophic 1980 attempt to rescue embassy personnel being held
hostage in Teheran. This incident, more than any other, triggered the
1986 creation of US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), which
was initiated by politicians, not by the military establishment itself. Once
established, the new command started a process of leveraging special op-
erations forces’ influence within the military organization.60 
Having US Special Operations Command as an overarching organi-
zation with distinct funding authority, responsibility for doctrines and for
coordinating tactics, techniques, and procedures within the complete spe-
cial operations forces community, helped improve the capabilities of SOF.
However, it can be argued that US Special Operations Command’s
strategic role is still challenged. According to Richard Schultz, organiza-
tional behavior and a lack of strategic influence prevented special opera-
tions from being an option to eliminate the emerging threat of Al Qaeda
prior to the 9/11 attack.61 Although Schultz’s article is written with the
benefit of hindsight, his argument illustrates the obstacles to special op-
erations forces’ being used for foreign policy purposes. Much changed af-
ter 9/11, illustrating the importance of a visible crisis to actually leverage
SOF’s status.62 Yet, according to the definition, it can be argued that cur-
60 Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces
(Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution, 1997), p. 319. See especially pp. 60–90
for a thorough account of political involvement in this process.
61 Richard H. Shultz Jr., “Nine Reasons Why we Never Sent our Special Operations
Forces After Al Qaeda Before 9/11”, Weekly Standard, 26 Jan 2004, vol. 9, issue 19
[online 7 Feb 2006].
Making New Ambitions Work 29rent special operations forces operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are gen-
erally not strategic special operations; to the degree these are strategic,
they support military strategic objectives, which again support foreign
policy.
Norwegian Special Operations Forces are, according to Parliamentary
Bill no. 42 (2003-2004), a strategic asset. The bill also emphasizes that
“increased manning at the operational level is necessary in order to
strengthen Commander National Joint Headquarter’s ability to direct
special operations forces missions when authority is transferred.”63 Com-
mand authority is thus normally retained at the military strategic level. 
Special operations with strategic objectives represent a spectrum of
operations conducted in peace, not in war. The extent to which Norwe-
gian authorities are psychologically capable of initiating such operations
is questionable, and certainly worth further study.
Command and Control of Special Operations Forces
NATO doctrine states that 
[b]ecause of the nature of special operations, a clear chain of
command, uncluttered by additional headquarters, is essential
[…] Special operations should be directed and controlled by a
special operations functional component commander called a
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) …64 
Within NATO, the higher headquarters-level for assigned SOF units is
therefore the operational level. 
National doctrine distinguishes between four levels of military ope-
rations. The political level is responsible for coordinating elements of na-
tional power in order to secure the nation’s interests, elements such as
diplomacy, information, military or economy. The military strategic level is
responsible for coordinating military efforts to support political inten-
tions. The operational level is responsible for planning and conducting joint
operations as set forth in political-strategic directives, while the tactical
62 This phenomenon is also apparent from World War II experience. Before World War
II, the Norwegian military organization did not have a special operations capability.
Between 1940 and 1945, most operations conducted on national territory were per-
formed by units either designated as SOF or conducting what can be labelled special
operations. After the German capitulation in May 1945, all special capable units were
transferred back to the conventional military. 
63 Forsvarsdepartementet, Den videre moderniseringen …, p. 56, author’s translation.
64 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(B), p. 8-6.
30 Defence and Security Studies 1-2007level is responsible for tactical deployments and the use of force in support
of operational plans. The hierarchy is illustrated in Figure 1.65       
Figure 1: Levels of military operation, and corresponding levels of responsibility
Norway’s political and military strategic level is integrated and co-
located in Oslo. The Minister of Defense retains political control over the
military organization via the Ministry of Defense, the Chief of Defense
holds a seat within the Ministry, which is an integrated civil-military or-
ganization. At the same time the Chief of Defense heads a small defense
staff, which is purely military and responsible for managing the military
organization. The defense staff is co-located with the civil-military min-
istry.66 The operational level headquarters, National Joint Headquarters,
is located in Stavanger, which contains a special operations element that
will act as advisors to the operational level commander when authority is
transferred from the Chief of Defense.67 As tactical units, the Marine-
jegerkommando (MJK) and the Hærens Jegerkommando (HJK) are lo-
cated in Ramsund and Rena respectively. 
65 These levels are retrieved from Forsvarets overkommando, Forsvarets Fellesoperative
Doktrine Del A, ch. 2.8., but are adapted to reflect recent changes in the military
organizational structure as set forth in Forsvarsdepartementet, Omleggingen av
Forsvaret … 
66 Forsvarsdepartementet, Forsvarsdepartementet: Integrert fra 1. August 2003 [Ministry of
defense integrated from August 1, 2003] (Oslo, 2003).
67 Fellesoperativt hovedkvarter [National Joint Headquarters], Forsvarets operative ledelse:
En handlekraftig fellesoperativ ledelse for nasjonal sikkerhet og internasjonalt engasjement [An
active joint leadership for national security and international engagement], Forsvars-
nett (Norwegian Defense [online 12 Dec 2005]), p. 5. As St.prp.nr.42 (2003-2004)
also highlights, NJHQ will only direct SOF operations when authority is transferred.
Making New Ambitions Work 31However, resources for the Special Forces are allocated through the
respective Service Chief, and not through the operational chain of com-
mand. It is commonly known that the further down the chain a unit is
located, the more resources are filtered. HJK is directly subordinate to the
Chief of Army Operations.68 In contrast, MJK is two levels below the
Commander of Kysteskadren [the Navy], who in turn is subordinate to the
Chief of Naval Operations.69 An organizational outline of NORSOF com-
mand and control relations is depicted in Figure 2. Kysteskadren has re-
cently been reorganized, but MJK’s organizational location, as depicted
in Figure 5, still applies for the purposes of this study. 
Figure 2: National command relations
According to AJP-01(B), NATO operations are “planned and executed at
three levels”: military-strategic, operational, and tactical.70 The responsi-
68 “Hærens Organisering” [Army Organization], Forsvarsnett (Norwegian Defense
[online 10 Nov]).
69 Forsvaret: “Kysteskadren” [the Navy], Forsvarsnett (Norwegian Defense [online 10
Nov 2005]). 
70 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(B), 2-1.
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Figure 3).
Figure 3: NATO’s levels of military operations and associated focus (from 
AJP-01(B)) 
The Allied strategic level deals with campaign objectives, while the op-
erational level plans and executes major operations. The tactical level is
concerned with individual battles and engagements. Figures 1 and 3 both
indicate that there is no clear separation between the various levels. 
NATO command structure is illustrated in Figure 4. The figure is
simplified, and only indicates functional names at the appropriate levels.
Unless operations are led from NATO’s established command structure,
a combined joint task force will normally be established to handle indi-
vidual operations. Figure 4 illustrates organizational arrangements for
such a force. This is also the current command relationship for NATO’s
ongoing operation in Afghanistan.71 Depending on the mission, a com-
bined joint task force may or may not have a special operations compo-
nent Commander attached. 
From the discussion thus far, it is clear that in a national context,
NORSOF’s level of influence is retained at the strategic level. From an
operational perspective, conditions are favorable for NORSOF as a strate-
gic tool. But from a force provider perspective, are resources allocated ap-
propriately? HJK is subordinate to the Chief of Army Operations,
allowing shorter administrative lines to the strategic level within the bu-
reaucracy, while MJK is located lower in the same hierarchy. The long-
71 NATO, International Security Assistant Force [online 10 Nov 2005].
Making New Ambitions Work 33term development of NORSOF as a collective institution in terms of
funding is therefore open to question.
Figure 4: NATO command hierarchy
In a NATO context, special operations forces’ operations support strategic
rather than political objectives. This does not exclude them from pursu-
ing political objectives, when the situation necessitates this. Since NATO
in practical terms does not pursue political objectives on behalf of indi-
vidual nations, and since consensus is required for collective action to be
initiated, strategic special operations are not likely to be an option. Stra-
tegic variables determining SOF’s utility in an Alliance context is first
and foremost found within classic, conventional strategy: time, space, and
force disposition.72 In other words, NATO Special Operations Forces as a
collective concept are still dominated by ideas associated with Cold War
strategy. 
Norwegian Special Operations Forces first of all have two roles with
respect to their utility: one within a national context, the other within
NATO. In the national context, NORSOF can pursue political objec-
tives, in a NATO context they can only pursue military objectives. 
72 Sverre Diesen, Militær strategi [Military Strategy], 2nd ed. (Oslo: J.W. Cappelens For-
lag AS, 1998), p. 60.
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This section describes Norwegian special operations from the Second
World War until today in order to provide an unclassified historical con-
text for current roles and missions. World War II is a good point of de-
parture because there is no tradition for irregular or unorthodox warfare
in a national context before this war. The situation is not unique to
Norway, and some have even argued that special operations forces are a
product of the Cold War, an arguable proposition beyond the scope of this
thesis.73 
World War II
I have limited the account to three groups, namely Company Linge, The
Shetland Group, and the Partisans of the Northern Norwegian region of
Finnmark. This is not to exclude Norwegians participating in other elite
or special operation units at the time, but these have been selected mainly
because Company Linge and the Shetland Group are arguably the most
famous of all the units operating during the war. The Partisans of
Finnmark, on the other hand, did not receive acknowledgement for their
contribution until 1995, almost 50 years after the end of World War II.74
Company Linge and the Shetland Group were initially created at an
early stage of the war by British authorities via the Special Operations Ex-
ecutive. Special Operations Executive, a secret organization, was author-
ized in 1940 directly by Churchill “to promote sabotage and subversion
in enemy occupied territory and to establish a nucleus of trained men
tasked with assisting indigenous resistance groups.”75 Command of the
units later fell under national authority as the Norwegian government
was reorganized in London. But their roles and tasks remained more or
less the same throughout the war. A third group, the Partisans of
Finnmark, are less known, but by studying the available documentation,
it is clear that partisan activity clearly fell within the special operations
category.
Company Linge was initially trained to perform raid operations based
upon the British Commando model. The raid force concept was aban-
doned by the end of 1941, although the Company participated in success-
73 Richard H. Shultz, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff and W. Bradley Stock (eds.), Special Opera-
tions Forces: Roles and Missions in the Aftermath of the Cold War (U.S. Special Operations
Command, 1995), p. 186. See also Arquilla (ed.), From Troy to Entebbe, p. 360.
74 Ståle Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen: Militærmakt eller folkeforsvar [Norwegian
Defense Traditions] (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 2002).
75 Records of Special Operations Executive, The National Archives [online 15 Nov 2005].
Churchill’s personal initiative with respect to the creation of SOE is often held up as
an example of the importance of special operations forces being nurtured by the polit-
ical elite. Kennedy’s personal interest in Green Berets and the development of US
SOF units during the Vietnam era is another example.
Making New Ambitions Work 35ful raids in Norway. The Company’s founder, Martin Linge, was killed in
a commando raid at Måløy in December 1941.
Company training was redirected towards irregular warfare with the
intent of deploying agents to organize, train and equip local resistance
groups.76 The goal was to create a unified resistance organization that
could support a possible allied invasion in Norway, attack communica-
tion nodes, conduct sabotage against selected targets, protect installations
in case of a German retreat, and maintain stability in the immediate af-
termath of a German capitulation. According to Jens Christian Hauge,
who commanded Milorg in 1944 and served as Norwegian Minister of
Defense from 1945 to 1952, it was mainly because of Company Linge
that Milorg achieved those ambitious goals.77 Its most famous operation,
often cited as one of the most important strategic operations of World
War II, was the 1943 attack on the heavy water plant at Rjukan.
Throughout the war, 530 operators were trained, 51 were killed in action,
and seven were captured. Several operators were killed during training,
indicating a high level of realism in exercises.
The Shetland Group was the result of a British attempt to organize
and utilize the refugee flow across the North Sea after the German occu-
pation. Fishermen and others contributed to the evacuation of both na-
tional refugees as well as British soldiers retreating from combat actions
in Norway after the capitulation in 1940. In November, Major L.H.
Mitchell went to Shetland to organize this activity.78 The intention was
to create a sustainable organization that could ferry agents and supplies to
Norway and return with refugees. Due to the heavy fortification of the
Norwegian coast, clandestine operations were the only viable option for
bringing in necessary personnel and supplies. The Shetland Group thus
became a major effort in shaping the various resistance organizations that
emerged during the war.
In 1942, the group’s operations, like Company Linge’s operations,
were coordinated with Norwegian authorities. In 1943, the Shetland
Group was implemented and organized in the Royal Norwegian Navy as
a special unit.79
The Shetland Group was also involved in offensive operations. In
1942, Leif Larsen, the most notable group member, towed two Chariots
(two-man torpedoes) with his fishing vessel across the North Sea into
Trondheimsfjorden in an attempt to attack the German battleship
Tirpitz. A severe storm made one of the Chariots break loose, and the mis-
76 The Norwegian military resistance movement was called “Milorg”.
77 Erling Jensen, Per Ratvik and Ragnar Ulstein (eds.), Kompani Linge, vol. 1, 2nd ed.
(Oslo: LibriArte, 1995), p. 12–13.
78 Forsvaret, “KNM Hitra” [HNoMS Hitra], Forsvarsnett (Norwegian Defense [online
16 Mar 2005]).
79 Ibid.
36 Defence and Security Studies 1-2007sion was aborted before the attack could be initiated.80 The Shetland
Group was later issued with US submarine chasers which radically im-
proved its operational capability. 
Due to the high-risk mission profile and harsh winter weather in the
North Sea, the Shetland Group suffered heavy losses throughout the war.
During the winter of 1942/43, German counter-operations sank several
vessels, leaving 33 dead. The largest individual loss occurred in Novem-
ber 1941, when the vessel Blia with a crew of 43 people was sunk.81 
A third group, the Partisans of Finnmark, consisted of refugees who
fled east after the German occupation. This group was organized and
trained by the Soviet Northern Fleet and the Soviet secret police, NKVD
(precursor to the KGB). Although minor operations had already com-
menced in late 1940, the term “partisan” in this context normally refers
to Norwegian personnel working for the Soviet Union between 1941 and
1944, 1941 referring to the German invasion of the Soviet Union in
1941, and 1944 to the liberation of Finnmark.82 Partisan activity was fo-
cused on operations in Troms and Finnmark, the two northernmost coun-
ties of Norway. 
The Soviets never coordinated partisan activity with Norwegian au-
thorities as did the groups organized by the British. Instead, partisans
were on occasions forced to sign a lifelong oath of allegiance to the Soviet
Union. Implicit in the oath were threats of punishment including death
if this connection was ever revealed. The partisans’ war efforts were thus
never appreciated. Instead, this group was subject to investigation after
the war on suspicion of espionage. Their war efforts, however, were sig-
nificant in the Soviet strategy of relieving German pressure against the
Soviet 14th Army at the Litsa-front.83 As such, their operations are inter-
esting in a special operations perspective.
Partisan missions focused on reconnaissance missions against German
shipping, establishing agent nets, and target acquisition on German base
structure. The area of operation, located 1000 kilometers north of the
Arctic Circle, was sparsely populated with very little vegetation, which
made operations extremely vulnerable to detection. Insertions could gen-
erally not be made during summer due to 24-hour daylight, and winter
weather was harsh, making insertions, whether by submarine or airdrops,
difficult. 
Early attempts to establish and run local agent nets or partisan groups
were quickly discovered by German counter-intelligence, mainly due to
80 Sven U. Larsen, “Shetlandsgjengen”, Norgeslexi [online 16 Mar 2005].
81 Ibid.
82 Tønne Huitfeldt, “De norske partisanene i Finnmark 1941–1944: I skyggen av den
kalde krigen” [Norwegian Partisans in Finnmark 1941–1944: In the shadow of the
Cold War] IFS Info, no. 3 (Oslo: Institutt for Forsvarsstudier, 1997), p. 5. 
83 Ibid., p. 17.
Making New Ambitions Work 37the transparency of the communities. The Soviets thus concluded that
permanent partisan warfare was not possible.84 
Strategic reconnaissance teams were initially more successful. De-
ployed at isolated locations on the coast, teams normally consisted of three
operators and a mission lasted at least six months. Strategic reconnais-
sance missions contributed to the Soviet success in disrupting German
naval supply lines established to support the 70,000 strong German pres-
ence in Finnmark and Northern Finland.85
Target acquisition on German air bases, fuel dumps, fortifications,
and soon, in vital areas enhanced the effectiveness of the Soviet Air Force’s
raids. In an early phase of the war, the Germans did not link the increas-
ingly large number of ships sunk and the exact targeting of military in-
stallations with enemy activity. When this connection became evident in
late 1942, German counter-intelligence initiated a series of counter-
operations. Through two operations, Mitternachtsonne and Tundra, major
portions of the partisan activity in Eastern Finnmark were uncovered.86 
The exact number of partisans explicitly trained and used in opera-
tions is not known for certain, but estimates suggest approximately 75
people. Partisan losses were more severe than for other groups. Ragnar
Ulstein, a noted Norwegian author, estimates 35 were killed or executed,
and refugees and captives brought the total loss close to 100 percent.87 
The groups described above where tasked to and conducted unortho-
dox or special operations throughout the war. Their personnel were spe-
cially trained and equipped for small unit tactics behind enemy lines. The
groups supported strategic or operational objectives through reconnais-
sance and direct action, on occasion also through Unconventional Warfare
in a wider interpretation. Whether the current doctrinal definition of spe-
cial operations applies to all three groups is open to debate. Company
Linge is arguably the only group that was “specially designated, organ-
ized, trained and equipped” as stated in NATO’s doctrine. Using
Arquilla’s definition, however, both the Shetland Group and the Partisans
of Finnmark clearly operated outside the realm that was categorized as
conventional at the time.
The major difference between World War II and contemporary oper-
ations is that the wartime groups operated behind enemy lines within
their own country. This does certainly not make their war effort less im-
portant, sacrificing, or heroic. But although partisan operations in
Finnmark were hampered by societal transparency, in general cultural
differences were clearly not a problem. On many occasions, the operators
were directly related to the areas in which they operated. Nevertheless,
84 Ibid., p. 7.
85 Ibid., p. 6–7.
86 Ibid., p. 11–13.
87 Huitfeldt, De norske partisanene …, p. 5.
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of conducting special operations in times of war. Accepting World War
II as a starting point for this tradition, it is therefore reasonable to assume
subsequent thinking around this issue is rooted in the Second World War
experience.
The Cold War
Shortly after World War II, most special purpose units were disbanded,
and their personnel were either dismissed or joined the conventional mil-
itary as it was reconstructed. This process was not unique to Norway. To
some degree, it reflects the status of special mission units and their tradi-
tional role in times of war and peace. “Special” units were initially not
considered part of the new military organization being recreated for a
changed security environment that included nuclear weapons. 
The origins of MJK and HJK can be traced back to the early 1950s
and 1960s. Both were organized under conventional military command
within their respective services. The degree to which their creation was
based on strategic or operational requirements, or resulted from enthusi-
astic insiders’ bottom-up approach, is subject to debate. The latter is
probably closer to the truth than the former.
Hærens Fallskjermjegerskole (HFJS), the origin of today’s HJK, was es-
tablished in 1962 as a school unit to train conventional Army reconnais-
sance units in parachute insertion techniques. In 1966 and 1967, the
school, located at Trandum outside Oslo, started educating its own fall-
skjermjegertropp, a platoon-size paratrooper unit designed for reconnais-
sance and sabotage in the enemy’s rear, an area beyond the scope of
conventional Army units. The main body of its personnel consisted of
conscripts serving a mandatory year of military service. At the same time,
the school changed its name to Hærens Jegerskole.88 
Marinejegerlaget, the origin of today’s MJK, was formally established
in 1968, although its origins are older. The National Intelligence Service,
strongly inspired by Italian and British successful underwater attacks
during World War II, asked the Navy in the early 1950s to establish a
diving school. With National Intelligence Service financial support, the
first class of froskemenn, frogmen, was examined in 1953.89 Training was
based on a model adopted from the U.S. Underwater Demolition Teams,
and its purpose was to develop “perfect saboteurs and underwater warri-
ors.”90 
88 Forsvaret, “Hærens Jegerkommando” [Norwegian Army Special Operations Com-
mando], Forsvarsnett (Norwegian Defense [online 15 Mar 2005]).
89  Erling Krange, Fra marinedykkingens historie i Norge [History of Norwegian Naval
Diving] (Kristiansand: Erkra Forlag, 1994), p. 99.
90 Ibid., 102. The quote is a translation of “perfekte sabotører og undervannskrigere”.
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al, deep-diving, rescue-diving and so forth, a decision was made in 1968
to disband the frogman organization and create two new units. Tasks cat-
egorized as offensive were assigned to Marinejegerlaget, and those defined
as defensive to Minedykkertroppen. The MJL tasks included sabotage
against ships and harbor installations, reconnaissance, raids, and the con-
duct of special operations at the joint level.91
Part of MJL’s education involved parachute insertion techniques. Co-
operation with HFJS had been initiated in 1965 for this purpose. The op-
erational concept was to drop personnel close to ships or harbor
installations, have them conduct the raid, and extract the operators with
the assistance of paratroopers located onshore. As the new organization
emerged, a decision was made to enlist most MJL personnel, mainly for
safety reasons, as the training program was assumed to be too dangerous
to be left to conscripts.92
It is the environment defined by the maritime or the land domain re-
spectively that traditionally have distinguished MJL and HJS. In 1978,
the Norwegian political authorities ordered the Armed Forces to establish
a counterterrorism capability aimed at assisting the police in case of terror
attacks against the oil infrastructure in the North Sea.93 Jurisdiction on
the continental shelf was and still is retained by the Norwegian Ministry
of Justice and the Police. The Army was tasked with establishing this ca-
pability. Forsvarets Spesialkommando (FSK) was established as part of HJS
to support this task. The unit was declared operational in 1984.94 
The decision to assign a maritime task to the Army might have al-
tered an established division of roles between MJL and HJS. According to
Jan Berglund, the creation of FSK implied that HJS had to focus on two
principal tasks: the 12-month training of the conscripted paratroopers,
and training for offshore counterterrorism, the latter being the most chal-
lenging. Due to the focus on counterterrorism, HJS was unable to fill its
traditional special operations role because the paratroopers were only ca-
pable of conducting limited special operation missions. However, MJL,
already partly professionalized and not involved in offshore operations,
broadened its range of traditional littoral tasks to include land-based op-
erations. Consequently, both units “have acquired expertise and tasks that
naturally should have been in the other SOF unit’s domain.”95
91 Ibid., 133. According to Krange, one task was to “cooperate with other services in
executing special operations”, in this paper understood as operational-level tasks.
92 Ibid., p. 135.
93 Justis- og politidepartementet, Samfunnssikkerhet og sivilt-militært samarbeid [Societal
security and civil-military cooperation] report no. 39 (2003-2004), Odin (Ministry of
Justice and Police [online 12 Jan 2006]), para 5.1.4.
94 Frode Danielsen, “An Asset: The Special Forces”, Forsvarsnett (Norwegian Defense
[online 15 Mar 2005])
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blurred. During the Cold War, this paradox never became apparent, nor
was it disputed. Yet MJL focused its training on littoral operations in
support of Naval operations, while HJS focused on training its paratroop-
er unit in support of land operations. It is not obvious to what degree tac-
tics, techniques, and procedures differed in the execution phase of a
mission. Both units have thus in principle possessed overlapping capabil-
ities since being established. 
In terms of command and control, both units had since their origin
been subordinate to the equivalent of today’s Service Chief. Assuming
MJL and HJS initially developed organizationally due to a “bottom-up”
approach rather than out of strategic necessity and guidance, tactical util-
ity was arguably the Service Chief’s rationale for maintaining the capabil-
ities MJL and HJS could offer. 
The national command structure has since World War II developed
from being very service-oriented towards today’s joint-oriented structure.
One milestone in this development was the 1971 establishment of the
Defense Command Northern Norway, where the basic idea was tri-service
integration and unity-of-command. The establishment of Defense Com-
mand North Norway in Bodø was the result of the Hauge II-committee
of 1967, which proposed the establishment of two national command
centers, one responsible for operations in Northern Norway and one
equally responsible for Southern Norway. Area of responsibility was di-
vided at the 65 degree parallel. Defense Command South Norway was es-
tablished accordingly, yet remained geographically divided between Oslo
and Stavanger until the 1980s when Defense Command South Norway
was united in Stavanger. Each Defense Command was in turn subordinate
to the Chief of Defense.96 In practical terms, this implied that units locat-
ed north of 65 degrees North were operationally controlled by the De-
fense Command North Norway through the respective Service
Commander, and vice versa for units located in the south. MJL, located in
Ramsund from the early 1970s, was under the operational control of the
Commander Naval Forces North Norway, which again was at the level
just below the Commander Armed Forces North Norway, which had op-
erational command north of the 65 degree parallel.
In 1979, a special operations office was established as part of Defense
Command North Norway where MJL and HJS started to exercise joint
command and control. Foreign special operations units participating in
exercises at the time were also controlled from this cell.97 The office was
95 Jan Berglund, “The Possible Merger of Norwegian Special Forces – an Assessment of
Key Factors” (term paper for MN 3121, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA,
2002). Berglund has previous operational experience in MJL and HJS/FSK; he served
as MJK commanding officer from 1993 to 1996.
96 Bjerga, Enhet Som Våpen, p. 107–112.
Making New Ambitions Work 41not formally established until later, and the command relationship to as-
signed units, including HJS, was only retained for the duration of the ex-
ercise. This arrangement was generally retained until 2002, when the
current command structure was implemented.
At the end of the Cold War, Norwegian Special Operations Forces’
roles and missions were thus focused on operational-level operations in-
cluding intelligence collection and raids in the enemy rear. Due to the de-
fensive posture of national strategy in general the missions were
principally to be executed on national territory in case the Cold War be-
came “hot”. The resemblance to strategy and tactics used in World War
II operations is obvious. The other principal NORSOF role was the off-
shore counterterrorist mission, retained by HJS. 
Post Cold War to the Present
The end of the Cold War implied changes to the Armed Forces’ tradition-
al missions and roles. Domestically, the debate focused on the relevancy
of a national strategy based on territorial defense. The economic situation
also changed, implying the Armed Forces needed to review the existing
structure, including its capabilities. Although the Government approved
13 propositions between 1993 and 2000 concerning merging or disband-
ing units or capabilities, this process was considered unsuccessful. The
change did not occur according to a strategic plan or idea, but rather as a
result of an acute necessity to reduce military expenditures.98 
However, in the 1990s, Norwegian Special Operations Forces were
spared while other units or capabilities were disbanded. The MJL had tra-
ditionally been a low-cost capability due to its small organization, low
technological requirements, and unique capabilities within the Navy.
This may explain why MJL was sustained as a capability. The HJS coun-
terterrorist role represented a unique capability within the military or-
ganization, which most likely explains why HJS was maintained despite
the severe cutbacks. In 1997, MJK daily organization consisted of ap-
proximately 40 personnel, expanding to approximately 160 personnel in
case of mobilization. HJK equivalent numbers were 90 and 210 respec-
tively.99
In 1991 MJL was renamed to Marinejegerkommandoen (MJK), and
in 1997 HJS was changed to Hærens Jegerkommando (HJK). HJK at the
same time relocated to the newly established Army camp at Rena in
Østerdalen. The term NORSOF was first used when both units were de-
97 Forsvarets overkommando: Forslag om samordning … This office was also known as the
UMO-cell (Unconventional Military Operations).
98 Jacob Børresen, Gullow Gjeseth, and Rolf Tamnes, Norsk Forsvarshistorie, vol. 5: Alli-
anseforsvar i endring [The History of the Norwegian Armed Forces] (Bergen: Eide For-
lag, 2004), p. 315.
99 Forsvarets overkommando: Forslag om samordning …
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Freedom, and is now a common term for the two units. It has no organi-
zational meaning and merely serves as a common denominator for Nor-
wegian Special Operations Forces. From 2006, HJK is officially renamed
to Forsvarets Spesialkommando/ Hærens Jegerkommando (FSK/HJK).
The abbreviation HJK will be used throughout this study.
From official sources, very little information is revealed on contem-
porary operations or the forces involved.100 What is commonly known,
though, is that MJK and HJK participated in NATO operations in the
Balkan conflicts,101 and HJK claim on their official home page to have
been deployed more or less continuously to international operations since
1996.102 It is, however, through recent operations in support of Operation
Enduring freedom that NORSOF has received most attention. While de-
ployments to the Balkan theater occurred after peace negotiations had
been formally declared and initiated, the 2001 deployment to
Afghanistan implied deploying for war. 
The post-Cold War era thus increased the focus on international op-
erations. Regarding NORSOF, this trend was not obvious, although
Norway has a long tradition of international military commitment
through various UN missions.103 Magne Rødahl, former Executive Offic-
er at HJK, claimed in 1998 that it was time to re-evaluate the type of
armed forces that Norway normally deployed to international peace oper-
ations, and subsequently time to explore Norwegian Special Operations
Forces’ potential in such operations.104 There were several reasons for
Rødahl’s claim. Prior to the Balkan Wars, the Army’s contributions to in-
ternational operations mainly consisted of volunteer units designed for a
specific mission or task, and normally deployed on UN peacekeeping
missions. Standing units, designed for national defense, were not de-
ployed collectively. These volunteer units were generally not deployed in
a combat role. That said, even UN peacekeeping missions could prove
challenging, as was demonstrated when Israel invaded southern Lebanon
in 1982 and Norwegian peacekeepers were suddenly caught in the line of
fire.105 The combat role was therefore at the time inconsistent with diplo-
matic as well as military traditions. As a small nation, Norway has tradi-
100 Danielsen, “An Asset: The Special Forces”.
101 Per Fr I. Pharo, “Norge på Balkan 1990–1999. ‘Lessons learned’” [Norwegian partic-
ipation in the Balkans 1990-1999] IFS Info, no. 3 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for
Defence Studies, 2000), p. 7.
102 Forsvaret, “Hærens Jegerkommando”.
103 Ulf Andenæs, “Internasjonal innsats Forsvarets nye mål:‘Ola Soldat’ går utenriks”
[International Operations the New Modus Operandi for the Armed Forces], Aften-
posten, 15 February 2001 [online 12 Dec 2005].
104 Magne Rødahl and Erik Dokken, “Norske spesialstyrker i fremtidige internasjonale
fredsoperasjoner operasjoner” [Norwegian Special Operations Forces in future inter-
national peace operations], Norsk Militært Tidsskrift, no. 10 (1998): 5.
105 Børresen, Gjeseth, and Tamnes, Norsk Forsvarshistorie, pp. 171–177. 
Making New Ambitions Work 43tionally sought to solve conflicts by means other than military force. The
Norwegian Armed Forces have equally been assigned a defensive role, and
traditionally been considered a last resort option for national defense. De-
ployments to the Balkan Wars, including NORSOF, represented a break
with existing traditions in the sense that standing units, prepared for
combat operations were deployed.106 A national “lessons learned” seminar
covering Norwegian military involvement in the Balkan Wars recom-
mended increasing the national special operations capabilities due to the
flexibility and versatility of the units themselves along with the interna-
tional recognition of the job they did.107 
Although little has been publicly released on international opera-
tions, a fair assumption is that Norwegian Special Operations Forces have
been utilized within their traditional domain, which is within the spec-
trum of direct action capabilities. Since October 2001, Operation Endur-
ing Freedom has focused on manhunt operations, implying that direct
action rather than indirect action capabilities are being utilized. Sean
Naylor, senior reporter for the US Army Times, claims that coalition spe-
cial operations forces, with the exception of the Australian Special Air
Service, did not bring in sufficient capabilities at an early phase of the
Afghanistan campaign to act in anything but a reconnaissance role.
Hence, he claims, coalition special operations forces’ role in Operation
Anaconda in February 2002 was operationally limited.108 While Naylor
may or may not be right – his sources are largely US, and to a great extent
anonymous – personnel from MJK and HJK have later been recognized
and awarded by US authorities for their contributions in Afghanistan.109
Lt. Gen. Dell Dailey, senior officer at the US Special Operations Com-
mand, claims in a recent (2006) interview that “even our own special op-
erations forces have a problem matching the terrain and the training
standard NORSOF represents.”110 
Domestically, HJK retains its offshore counterterrorist role. Al-
though HJK claims it is standing by for other counterterrorist operations
as well, this claim is contested. HJK obviously has the capability, but
military support to police operations is restrictive. One basic precondition
for the military to support domestic police operations is that the police in
a particular operation must lack personnel, expertise or equipment.111
106 Naval ships or Air Force detachments have always deployed as standing units. Such
deployments includes for the Navy participation in NATO’s standing naval forces.
107 Lessons Learned seminar for politicians, officers, academics, and high-ranking civil
servants, April 2000, coordinated by the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies,
the Norwegian Staff College, and the National Defence College.
108 Sean Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda (New York:
Berkley Books, 2005), p. 425.
109 Ole K. Eide, “Special Forces Acknowledged”, Forsvarsnett (Norwegian Defense
[online 18 Mar 2005]).
110 Riseth, Kim, “Vil ha norske soldater [Wants Norwegian soldiers], Verdens Gang, 23
November 2006. 
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al police only have limited capabilities offshore, they maintain the full re-
sponsibility for onshore counterterrorism operations. Nevertheless, as
long as HJK is on standby for offshore missions, it represents an option
for policy makers regardless of the location of the target. 
Likewise, MJK has on occasion been used to support the Coastguard’s
operations, exemplified by the October 2005 Elektron incident. During an
inspection by the Coastguard, the skipper of the Russian trawler, Elektron,
decided to run for Russian territorial waters with two Coastguard inspec-
tors still on board. According to Rear Admiral Grytting, who was respon-
sible for handling this incident, only bad weather prevented the vessel
from being boarded.112 The inspectors were released when Elektron
reached Russian territorial waters.
In support of Berglund’s earlier assertion, the question whether MJK
and HJK share the same roles and missions is arguably a result of what
would seem to be two contradictions: Both units deployed during the
Balkan Wars and Afghanistan, two landlocked theaters, and both units
are trained for potential domestic roles in a maritime counterterrorism
scenario. 
Naylor raises the first contradiction as an issue regarding the Ameri-
can use of navy SEALs in the current conflict in Afghanistan. His anony-
mous sources claim that SEALs had no role in a land warfare scenario.
Rather, this is the domain of Army Special Forces.113 There is, however,
no historical precedence for this claim. Navy personnel or units have on
occasion successfully contributed to irregular operations outside the na-
vy’s traditional areas of operation.114 
One significant difference between army and navy SOF units is the
environment where their activity normally takes place. This can be called
the unit’s niche, and could be illustrated by the US division of roles. Land
operations normally fall within the land component commander’s do-
main; hence support to army operations is traditionally a responsibility of
the US army’s special forces. The same applies to the US navy’s SEAL-
teams and their support of naval operations. 
However, as part of the army, Special Forces were originally created
with the purpose of conducting irregular warfare in Eastern Europe in
111 Justis- og politidepartementet, Samfunnssikkerhet og sivilt-militært samarbeid, ch. 4.2.
112 Kjetil Olsen, “Marinejegere skulle borde Elektron” [MJK should board the Ele-
ktron], Aftenposten, 12 January 2006 [online 4 Dec 2006]. In this newspaper article,
Chief of Police in Tromsø, Truls Fyhn, claims he was aware that MJK was deployed in
support of the operation. This information is neither confirmed nor denied by mili-
tary officials. Whether this is a fact or not, this incident at least exemplifies a poten-
tial utility of special operations forces in times of crisis.
113  Naylor, Not a Good Day to Die.
114  Milton E. Miles, “Chinese Pirates and the SACO Dragon” in John Arquilla ed.: From
Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times (Lanham, MD: University
Press of America, 1996), p. 288–311.
Making New Ambitions Work 45case the Cold War went hot, and later to act in a counterinsurgency role
in Vietnam. The Special Forces’ modus operandi was thus focused on in-
direct action capabilities, primarily through their unconventional warfare
task. The primary mission was to establish resistance groups (guerrilla
warfare in Eastern Europe) or population control (counterinsurgency in
Vietnam).115 The Special Forces retained an offensive capability, partly
because this is a component of any small unit’s tactical requirements, and
partly because training indigenous forces required this knowledge. Cul-
tural knowledge and linguistic capabilities, however, are the primary fo-
cus for those working with local populations, whether they be guerrillas
or civilians and whether this is done within a unconventional warfare con-
text or as foreign internal defense. 
For the SEALs, the traditional support to the US navy has emphasized
maritime capabilities. Operating in the littoral for intelligence or raiding
purposes, or supporting the navy with maritime interdiction capabilities
for embargo operations, requires direct action capabilities. Diving, espe-
cially combat diving, is equally embedded in the maritime environment
as a maritime task. The counterinsurgency or guerrilla role is thus not the
SEALs primary focus. Navy SEALs can act in an advisory role, but since
this is not their principal role, such missions are primarily assigned to the
Special Forces. US Special Forces and SEALs thus possess capabilities
within each other’s domain, which might seem odd from a defense reform
perspective. The key to understanding this redundancy in terms of capa-
bilities, is that both must possess small unit tactics capabilities in order
to perform their primary missions. Figure 5, derived from Adams, illus-
trates special operations forces’ redundancy, regardless of primary mis-
sion.116 
Figure 5: SOF redundancy in terms of capabilities
115 Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action.
116 Ibid., p. 16.
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tion. Due to the level of precision and perfection required in hostage res-
cue operations, the US has established separate units to fill this role, the
Army Delta Force and the Navy SEAL Team Six.117 Whether it is relevant
to compare the US structure with Norwegian requirements can be ar-
gued. But this illustrates that different special operations forces units fill
different niches, by nature implying redundant capabilities. In the US
structure, however, various units are as a principle assigned primary and
secondary roles and missions. 
The second contradiction is that MJK and HJK are both seemingly
trained for counterterrorist operations. Although the HJK is the only unit
specifically assigned a national maritime counterterrorist role, MJK
shares at least a similar capability through its focus on supporting the Na-
vy.118 Traditionally, support to maritime interdict operations is part of
Naval SOF units’ tactical support to maritime operations. 
It can thus be argued that NORSOF has traditionally focused on di-
rect action rather than indirect action capabilities. The question, however,
is whether this is sufficient or desirable in the future. 
Summary: Defining NORSOF Roles
History and recent practice both indicate that Norwegian Special Opera-
tions Forces’ traditional roles and missions continue to be within the di-
rect action spectrum of special operations, or strategic reconnaissance and
direct action as defined in current doctrine. Created during the Cold War
for Cold War purposes and requirements, NORSOF represented a
service-based joint capability, hence the special operations forces became
an operational asset in pursuit of strategic objectives. 
Throughout the Cold War, MJL and HJS continued to have what
seemed to be similar or overlapping tasks. However, each unit focused on
the environment as defined by their parent service: MJL operated in the
littorals and HJS inland. Thus both units represented a service-based ca-
pability. The environment was then and remains now an important part
of their individual niche; it represents an important component of their
joint roles. The two organizations, MJL and HJS, thus had overlapping
tasks as they both conducted strategic intelligence and direct action mis-
sions.
HJS was assigned a domestic offshore counterterrorism role in 1981,
thus bringing a new capability to the Armed Forces. Introducing mari-
time counterterrorism arguably altered the established land/maritime
distinction between MJL and HJS. While MJL expanded its missions to
117 Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action, pp. 160–167.
118 Det nye Sjøforsvaret: Omstilling i Sjøforsvaret 2004–2010 [Changing the Navy 2004–
2010] (Bergen: Kysteskadren, 2005), p. 5.
Making New Ambitions Work 47include operations beyond the littoral area, HJS concentrated its focus on
the maritime domain.
The international deployments of Norwegian Special Operations
Forces started with the Balkan Wars in the 1990s. National lessons
learned from the Balkan Wars suggested a further expansion of NOR-
SOF’s capabilities, regardless of the costs involved. To a certain extent,
this advice has been followed. HJK has been able to deploy internation-
ally since 1996, while retaining its domestic task. According to
Berglund, HJK did not have this capability before 1990. Likewise, MJK
has expanded its organization to manage its deployments. The degree to
which MJL had this capability prior to 1990 is unclear. 
However, NORSOF has drawn most public attention by virtue of re-
cent deployments in support of Operation Enduring Freedom. At the
same time, the fact that both Afghanistan and the Balkans are landlocked
theaters has fuelled an impression that it will be cost effective to merge
the two units. A question then arises: Why does the small state of Norway
need both a Navy and an Army SOF capability? If one believes the envi-
ronment is the niche where one unit has certain advantages compared to
the other, this contradiction is no longer apparent. As current interna-
tional practice illustrates, some degree of overlap between units should be
considered a strength rather than a weakness. 
Recent deployments indicate that Norwegian Special Operations
Forces have still deployed as an operational level asset supporting opera-
tional or strategic level objectives. This is also consistent with national
and NATO doctrine. Yet, NORSOF has a strategic role in a national con-
text as stated in Parliamentary Bill no. 42 (2003-2004). This study would
claim that existing doctrine does not cover this expanded role, and sug-
gests a new definition. Thus Norwegian Special Operations Forces can be
seen as having two roles: First, a strategic role in direct support of national
foreign policy objectives, secondly in support of allied strategic and
operational objectives. Regarding the former role, direct support of na-
tional foreign policy seems unexplored through historical practice.

Chapter 3A New Security Environment,
Changed Threats, and New
Strategies
This chapter looks at the current security environment and potential
strategies available to deal with emerging threats. The chapter intends to
highlight the nature of the security environment and perceived future
threats, and to discuss possible national strategies to deal with this envi-
ronment.
The current framework for assessing future challenges for the Norwe-
gian Armed Forces considers the type (conventional and asymmetric) and
location (national or international) of potential conflicts.119 It may be dis-
cussed whether today’s conflicts are best understood within a convention-
al or asymmetric framework. Based on recent experiences from
Afghanistan and Iraq, one likely scenario is that future conflicts will be of
both types, more or less at the same time. The location of future conflicts
and its implications have been more prevalent as considerations in the na-
tional defense debate. Simply put, should the Norwegian Armed Forces
prepare for national or international tasks? While there is dissent sur-
rounding the answer to this question, debaters concur that the Norwegian
military alone cannot deter or prevent an invasion of its national territory.
The crux of the discussion is to what extent Norway must participate in
international operations in order to receive sufficient military and politi-
cal support from its allies in case of attack on the homeland. In other
words, what national strategies must be adopted to ensure Alliance cred-
ibility? 
The rest of this study will focus on the official view, which concludes
that only via international engagement can Allied reinforcements be
guaranteed in case of a future territorial dispute. There are, however, other
schools of thought, or alternative ideas, most notably represented and ex-
pressed by Commodore (ret.) Jacob Børresen. He claims, contrary to the
119  Diesen, “Moderniseringen av Forsvaret …”
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today than was the case during the Cold War. While Børresen and others
certainly bring a necessary and relevant dimension to the defense debate,
this view will not be pursued to any extent.120 
A New Definition of Security?
The end of the Cold War altered the existing concept of security, a con-
cept that since World War II had been more or less exclusively focused
on state security, or state survival.121 Recently, the concept of societal se-
curity has increased in importance. “Societal security concerns the safe-
guarding of the population and the protection of key societal functions
and important infrastructure against attack and other kinds of damage, in
situations in which the existence of the state as such is not threatened.”122
Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are re-
garded as the gravest threats to societal security. Due to its domestic na-
ture, societal security is mainly the concern of civilian leaders and police
forces, but the military organization must be prepared “to contribute
when needed.”123 In addition, human security, i.e. “protecting the indi-
vidual with regards to human rights …”124 has become increasingly im-
portant. Humanitarian concerns have been the direct objective of several
interventions since the Cold War, including Somalia in 1992 and Kosovo
in 1999.
An expanded security concept has “major significance for the tasks
that military forces might be asked to carry out, and therefore also for
training, equipment and operational concepts of the Norwegian Armed
Forces.”125 Although the requirements of security have changed, the fun-
damental focus remains on state security and national survival. With the
absence of a clear and present danger, the fundamental question then be-
comes how to best secure the state’s interest. 
In 2004, the Ministry of Defense issued its strategic concept Relevant
Force, stating the following generic objectives for Norwegian security pol-
icy:126
1. Prevent war and the emergence of various kinds of threats to 
Norwegian and collective security
120 For a comprehensive version of Børresen’s ideas and arguments, see Jacob Børresen,
Forsvar uten trussel: Det norske Forsvarets rolle og funksjon etter den kalde krigen [Defense
without threats: The role of the Armed Forces in the aftermath of the Cold War]
(Oslo: Abstrakt Forlag, 2005).
121 Forsvarsdepartementet, “Relevant Force”: 16.
122 Ibid.: 16.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.: 17.
126 Ibid.: 48.
Making New Ambitions Work 512. Contribute to peace, stability and the further development of 
the international rule of law 
3. Uphold Norwegian sovereignty, Norwegian rights and 
interests, and protect Norwegian freedom of action in the 
face of political, military and other kinds of pressure 
4. Defend, together with our allies, Norway and NATO against 
assault and attack
5. Protect society against assault and attack from state and non-
state actors.
According to Relevant Force, the military must prepare for eight specific
tasks to achieve these objectives. These tasks are divided into three cate-
gories. “National tasks that are solved without Alliance support”. “Tasks
carried out in cooperation with allies and possibly others”, implying coa-
lition operations, preferably through NATO. “Other tasks” are support-
ing tasks to ministries other than the Ministry of Defense. The specific
tasks are:127
National tasks
1. Ensure a national basis for decision-making through timely 
surveillance and intelligence gathering.
2. Exercise Norwegian sovereignty.
3. Exercise authority in defined areas.
4. Prevent and handle security-related incidents and crises in 
Norway and in areas under Norwegian jurisdiction.
Tasks carried out in cooperation with allies and possibly others
5. Contribute to the collective defence of Norway and other 
parts of NATO against threats, assaults and attacks, includ-
ing the use of weapons of mass destruction.
6. Contribute to multinational crisis management, including 
multinational peace operations.
Other tasks
7. Provide military support to diplomacy and to prevent the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
8. Contribute to the safeguarding of societal security and other 
vital societal tasks.
While at first glance both objectives for security policy and tasks to the
military might seem reasonable, neither, with the possible exception of
127 Ibid.: 61–66.
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to the specific roles and missions of Norwegian Special Operations Forces.
The Nature of the New Security Environment
Much is said about the new security environment. This section reviews
only the most important features with regards to their implications for
Norway. This analysis is undertaken in light of the expanded view of na-
tional security as outlined above, and includes state security, societal se-
curity, and human security. The analysis uses the framing of tasks as
either national or Alliance-driven.
The National Context 
The conclusion of the Cold War ended an era where a single threat deter-
mined the military’s roles and missions. Although it still maintains a sub-
stantial military presence in and around the Kola Peninsula, Russia’s
political intentions seem to have changed. One of the pleasant implica-
tions is that the current threat of conventional war is negligible, at least
in the short-term.128
Although conventional war is a less likely threat to state security,
Norway still has unresolved jurisdictional disputes within its vast mari-
time economic zone. Figure 6 depicts Norway’s economic zone (NEZ),
which expands close to seven times Norway’s land mass. More than 70
percent of national revenues are extracted from activities in NEZ, and
more than 80 percent of national import and export are shipped through
this zone.129 To secure free access, not only to NEZ, but to the high seas
in general, is therefore a vital national interest.
128 Diesen, ”Moderniseringen av Forsvaret …”
129 Vidar Hope, “Regjeringen satser i nord: Må ha tung tilstedeværelse” [The Govern-
ment prioritizes the Barents Region: Must have a heavy presence], I Marinen, no. 7
(2005): 7.
Making New Ambitions Work 53Figure 6: Norwegian Economic Zone (from ioParliamentary Bill no. 42 
(2003-2004)).
Issues concerning sovereignty rights in the Barents region have been con-
tested for decades.130 Today, the Barents region is increasingly economi-
cally important due to greater petroleum exploration. Although
sovereignty issues will most likely lead to nothing more than a diplomatic
tug of war, a satisfactory agreement has so far proven impossible. Several
arrests of Russian and EU vessels fishing illegally in disputed areas around
Spitzbergen and Bjørnøya late 2005, along with the more dramatic Ele-
ktron incident, illustrate this area’s potential to spark off a more serious
crisis. Willy Østreng, Director of the Centre for Advanced Study in Oslo,
asserts that these incidents have the clear potential to set back political re-
130 The contested areas are associated with the 200-mile zones surrounding Svalbard, and
the disagreement on the demarcation line in the “grey zone” in the Barents Sea. See
Utenriksdepartementet, “Norway and Russia: Fisheries”, Odin (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs [online 4 Jan 2006]).
54 Defence and Security Studies 1-2007lations between Russia and Norway. Maintaining a firm yet credible pol-
icy with regard to jurisdiction in this region is therefore essential.131 
On the mainland, Norway shares a 196 km long border with Russia.
The Army retains national responsibility for surveillance and control of
the remote parts of the shared border. This mission is executed on behalf
of the Ministry of Justice and Police. The Army is issued limited police
jurisdiction to quickly respond to border violations. The principal threats
to this border are activities related to organized crime, and potentially
smuggling of nuclear, biological, or chemical substances.132 The border
runs through a relatively isolated area, and the possibility of terrorists
using this route to pass from east to west cannot be excluded. 
The Global Context
International terrorism and local/ regional wars are currently assessed to
be more likely threats than conventional war, and societal security is thus
challenged more than state security.133 Apart from global terror networks,
weak or failed states, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
these threats are not sufficiently understood. On top of this diffuse situa-
tion, globalization has made national economies increasingly dependent
on international stability, which makes promoting peace, stability, and
democracy in troubled regions a national interest.134 This somewhat
vague description of threats illustrates the complexity of today’s threat
environment. 
Terrorism in itself is not a new phenomenon. What is new, though,
is that non-state actors are capable of inflicting damage and fear to an ex-
tent previously reserved nation states. This new wave of terrorism is char-
acterized by its fanaticism and determination “to inflict maximum
civilian and economic damages on distant targets in pursuit
of … extremist goals.”135 What is generally expected is that non-state ac-
tors led or under the influence of Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda, are will-
ing to use weapons of mass destruction to promote their cause. It is
unnecessary to document Al Qaeda’s potential to wreak havoc, which was
most clearly demonstrated by the attacks in New York and Washington,
D.C. in 2001, and later in Madrid and London. 
Another trend is that the existence of weak and failed states increas-
ingly has regional or global ramifications or spillover effects. The ongoing
131 Eirik L. Berglund, “Fare for opptrapping” [Danger of escalation] Nordlys, 25 October
2005 [online 4 Jan2006].
132 Espen B. Eide, Ny regjering – ny sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikk? [New government – new
security and defense policy?], speech at The Norwegian Military Academy 16
December 2005, Odin (Ministry of Defense [online 7 Jan 2006]).
133 Forsvarsdepartementet: Den videre moderniseringen …, p. 19.
134 Ibid., p. 20.
135 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylva-
nia Press, 2004), p. vii.
Making New Ambitions Work 55war on terror is illustrative. States like Afghanistan and Pakistan are har-
bingers of international terrorism. Although Pakistan is a crucial ally to
the US in the global war on terrorism, its political and military control in
Waziristan, a border region to Afghanistan, is seriously questioned.136
The same argument can be used for regions on the African continent,
where government functions in some instances are completely absent,
Somalia arguably being the best example.
Norway and Norwegian interests have so far not been directly target-
ed by this new wave of terrorism. There are several reasons why this might
be the case. The relative size of the Norwegian population compared to
Spain or Great Britain’s for instance, makes society itself more transpar-
ent. Likewise, having a smaller immigration community than many other
European countries allows for better control over potential radicalization
within these groups. Norwegian foreign policy has also traditionally fo-
cused on promoting respect for international law based on justice and di-
plomacy rather than power. Norway in 1904 was entrusted with the
authority to award the Nobel Peace Prize, further illustrating the nation’s
peaceful traditions.137 Thus, this perception of Norway being a peaceful
nation without harmful foreign policy agendas might have had an im-
pact.
Nonetheless, Jørn Holme, head of the Norwegian Police Security
Service, claims it is just a matter of time before Scandinavia is hit by an
attack. According to Holme, Norway is currently used as a safe haven by
terrorists planning operations in Europe, and could in the future be re-
garded as a soft target due to its rather liberal society.138 In addition,
Norway is a strategic energy partner for several European countries, a fact
which might lead to terrorism on Norwegian soil for strategic purposes.
Lastly, Norway has participated with troops in both Afghanistan and
Iraq. Whether a UN resolution was the premise for military support is
probably irrelevant to a terrorist. To assume Norway is safe from interna-
tional terrorism is therefore imprudent.
A third trend is that conflicts have increasingly shifted from conven-
tional, interstate wars towards intrastate conflicts or civil wars. Between
1946 and 1955, the ratio between these types of conflicts was approxi-
mately equal. Between 1996 and 2000, the ratio shifted to 1:20, while
the number of conflicts has remained unchanged. Likewise, the relation-
ship between civilian and military casualties has shifted from 1:8 to 8:1
over the last 100 years.139 The increasingly deliberate targeting of civil-
136 David Montero, “Pakistan’s Tribal Strategy”, Christian Science Monitor, 25 January
2006 [online 1 Feb 2006].
137 Olav Riste, “War and Peace in the Political Culture of Scandinavia in the 20th Cen-
tury”, IFS Info, no. 5 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defense Studies, 2003): 8.
138 “Militants Will Try to Hit Scandinavia”, Aftenposten, 14 December 2005 [online 5
Jan 2006].
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gically oriented. Geography matters less than affiliation. The shift from
conventional wars towards “other” wars has led to new terms like Low In-
tensity Conflict, Military Operations Other Than War, Crisis Response
Operations and the like. The current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq
both exemplify a Low Intensity Conflict, which is normally defined as a
protracted conflict between a state and non-state actors.140
National Interests
With the exception of threats to state security, Norway’s national inter-
ests are connected to the maritime environment in general and the Nor-
wegian Economic Zone (NEZ) in particular. The ability to defend
national interests is inherently connected to international stability, which
Norway cannot provide on its own. Collective security is thus a keyword.
Relevant Force states that 
protection of the environment, welfare and economic security
is … a fundamental security interest for Norway … Norwegian
security interests thus comprise challenges that might threaten
international law, human rights, democracy and the rule of law,
economic security, and the environment.141 
It can thus be concluded that it is in the nation’s interest to protect and
defend these values.
Upholding national control of the vast economic zone is vital for the
national economy. Protection of the petroleum infrastructure is deemed
particularly vital, not only by national authorities, but also for consumers.
“The same is the case for international regulations and principles connect-
ed to the freedom of the seas and the management of resources in the
oceans.”142 
National security is closely connected to Euro-Atlantic security. Pro-
moting “democracy in regions adjacent to Europe”143 is therefore deemed
a national security interest. Norway cannot do this by itself. Collective
measures, primarily through NATO, thus become important in this ob-
139 Jan Ångström, “Lågintensiva konflikter som forskningsområde: En introduktion”
[Introduction to Low Intensity Conflicts as Area of Research] in En ny medeltid? En
introduktion i lågintensiva konflikter [Introduction to Low-Intensity Conflicts], Arne
Baudin, Thomas Hagman and Jan Ångström eds., (Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan,
2002), p. 3.
140 Bjørn Marcusson, “Kärt barn har många namn? Lågintensiva konflikter och de mil-
itärteoretiska klassikerna” [Low- Intensity Conflicts and Military Theory] in En ny
medeltid? En introduktion i lågintensiva konflikter [Introduction to Low-Intensity Con-
flicts], Arne Baudin, Thomas Hagman and Jan Ångström eds. (Stockholm, Sweden:
Försvarshögskolan, 2002), p. 62.
141 Forsvarsdepartementet, “Relevant Force”: 17–18.
142 Ibid., 18.
143 Ibid.
Making New Ambitions Work 57jective. It is a national interest to create conditions favorable for collective
security. The same argument applies to the UN’s role as a transnational
organ promoting international law.
National interests are therefore closely tied to the concept of security,
where it must be assumed that national security is ranked higher than so-
cietal security, which in turn is ranked higher than human security. Ac-
cepting that Norway alone cannot defend its national interests in a hostile
environment, a coherent alliance affiliation is the primary goal for nation-
al security. Defending national interests connected to the maritime envi-
ronment, with emphasis on the NEZ, will be the next priority, along with
societal security. Promoting democracy outside Europe is thus deemed
less important than maintaining the national economy and national sur-
vival.
A Changed Strategy: From Territorial Defense to 
International Operations
As a small nation Norway first of all seeks to solve international disputes
through diplomacy rather than conflict. Diplomacy alone is, however, not
sufficient to guarantee national sovereignty as was proved by the German
invasion in 1940. A pre-World War II era of neutrality was exchanged for
NATO membership in 1949, and for the next 50 years the national strat-
egy evolved around Alliance reinforcement. When the Soviet Union col-
lapsed in 1989, this strategy suddenly became obsolete. 
According to Iver B. Neumann, a professor at the University of Oslo,
a serious impediment to creating a coherent national strategic plan was
the lack of a national strategic concept. Since Neumann made this claim
in 2002, Relevant Force has been developed to fill this gap. Yet, as
Neumann claims, the next step is to “concretize and formulate a national
security strategy … and align military doctrines in accordance with the
strategy.”144 The national security strategy is still lacking. However, his-
torical precedents suggest strategic trends from which future NORSOF
roles and mission could be derived. 
Since its inception, Norwegian governments have consistently con-
sidered the UN the principal organ promoting international security and
stability. Between 1947 and 2000, more than 50,000 personnel partici-
pated in 30 missions around the world, the longest operation being 20
years of commitment to UNIFIL in Lebanon.145 Until Operation Desert
144 Iver B. Neumann, “Norges handlingsrom og behovet for en overordnet sikkerhet-
spolitisk strategi” [National Options and the Necessity of a Security Polical Strat-
egy], Det sikkerhetspolitiske bibliotek, no. 3 (2002) (The Norwegian Atlantic Committee
[online 12 Dec 2005]): 19, author’s translation.
145 Forsvaret: “Norsk deltakelse i internasjonale fredsoperasjoner” [Norwegian Participa-
tion in International Peace Operations], Forsvarsnett (Norwegian Defense [online 7
Jan 2006]).
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clusively with UN peace operations. 
Since the mid-1990’s, however, international deployments have
shifted in favor of NATO and US-led operations. The reason has not been
discontent with UN so much as a lack of personnel resources.146 On the
other hand, the UN’s ability to direct independent military operations
under its own leadership is challenged due to several failed peacekeeping/
peace enforcement operations in the 1990s. Rwanda and Bosnia are but
two UN operations where expectations were not met, whether from the
local population, the UN forces themselves, or international society at
large. The recent oil-for-food scandal involving high-ranking UN offi-
cials also indicates an ineffective and unhealthy organizational culture.
Nevertheless, the Stoltenberg II Government in Norway has re-
emphasized the importance of the UN as a promoter of peace, stating that
“[i]t is in Norway’s interest to have the UN leading the new world order,
and not to have a situation where nations do whatever they like.”147 The
latter could be seen as a sidekick to the previous government’s (Bondevik
II) more US-friendly approach to foreign policy. This shift in favor of the
UN is nevertheless more aligned with the historical tendency in Norwe-
gian foreign policy issues.
NATO has been the cornerstone of Norwegian security policy since
1949. The emphasis on neutrality that kept Norway out of First World
War, but failed to do the same in World War II, was abandoned for Al-
liance partnership in 1949. Yet, as part of the Alliance, Norway main-
tained a “non-aggressive” posture through its membership, hoping to
reduce Great Power tensions on the Scandinavian peninsula. Several re-
strictions were unilaterally imposed on NATO’s strategy. Neither nucle-
ar weapons nor permanent basing were allowed on national territory in
times of peace. The Cold War military strategy was fairly straightforward
– maintain a firm posture in defensive positions and await Alliance rein-
forcements.
Since 1990 NATO has been transforming, as have its member coun-
tries. The most important change to NATO’s strategy is the adoption of
the out-of-area concept as set out in the 1999 Strategic Concept and reit-
erated at the Prague Summit in 2002. With this concept, NATO and its
member countries must be prepared for operations on a global scale.148
NATO’s Response Force (NRF) concept is another important result
of the transformation. NRF, which was supposed to be fully operational
146 Ulriksen, Den norske forsvarstradisjonen, p. 251.
147 “Plattform for regjeringssamarbeidet mellom Arbeiderpartiet, Sosialistisk Ven-
streparti og Senterpartiet 2005–2009” [Soria Moria declaration], Odin [online 11 Dec
2006].
148 Ian Forbes, “The Transformation of NATO”, speech by Deputy Allied Command
Transformation Admiral Sir Ian Forbes, Hoyres Hus, Oslo, 25 May 2004 (The Nor-
wegian Atlantic Committee).
Making New Ambitions Work 59by 2006, is a rapid reaction force designed to conduct the full spectrum
of military operations from show of force to forced entry operations. Em-
phasis is placed on deployability and interoperability, both necessary to
fulfill new missions.149 Norwegian Special Operations Forces have been
part of Norway’s force contributions to NRF.
NATO’s ambitions are clear, but the Alliance still works on the basis
of political consensus. Out-of-area missions are therefore still likely to be
politically challenging, especially because NRF participation commits
more than did earlier contributions.150 It remains to see to what extent
NRF will be an effective tool. NRF was not deployed for Afghanistan in
August-September this year when NATO experienced its fiercest combat
operations so far in it’s history.151
NATO’s core mission remains collective defense as defined by
NATO’s Charter Article 5. However, most of NATO’s involvements
since the Cold War have been non-Article 5 missions ranging from peace-
keeping in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan, to combating terrorism in
the Mediterranean, to supporting disaster relief in Pakistan. Although
NATO’s efforts are impressive, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, NATO Secretary
General, admits the Alliance is driven more by short-term ad-hoc deci-
sions than by fundamental strategic choices. “In Afghanistan, for exam-
ple, [NATO’s] political rhetoric was not always matched by
corresponding military commitments.”152 
NATO’s ongoing mission in Afghanistan, ISAF, is currently the larg-
est operation involving Norwegian forces abroad.153 Currently, Norway
contributes approximately 500 personnel to ISAF, including maintaining
responsibility for the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Meymaneh. The
forces are presently committed to Northern Afghanistan only. 
NATO’s first operation outside Europe also shows the inherent weak-
nesses of warfare by consensus. As the Afghan insurgency has steadily in-
creased in intensity since 2002, the Norwegian debate is focused on the
tension between deploying Norwegian forces according to Commander
ISAF’s requirements on the one hand, and national caveats on the other.
The current national commitments are tied to the provinces in the north,
and not to the more troubled regions in the south. Refusing to let Nor-
wegian troops be redirected to the south where they are arguably more
needed opens up for criticism internally in NATO.154 The criticism ap-
149 “The NATO Response Force: At the Center of NATO Transformation”, Allied Rapid
Reaction Corps (NATO [online 23 Aug 2004]).
150 Harald Eraker, “Nato-oppdragene Norge må si ja til” [NATO Missions Norway must
accept], NyTid, 14 October 2005 [online 1 Feb 2006].
151 Jonathan Marcus, “Nato Struggles in Afghanistan,” BBC News, 14 September 2006
[online 27 Nov 2006].
152 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, “Keeping NATO Relevant: A Shareholders Report”, speech
by NATO Secretary General at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Annual Session,
Copenhagen, 15 November 2005, Online Library (NATO [online 2 Feb 2006]).
153 Eide, Ny regjering – ny sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikk?
60 Defence and Security Studies 1-2007plies not only to Norway, but to the German and Italian force contribu-
tions as well. When refusing to deploy Norwegian Special Operations
Forces to Afghanistan in October the fall of 2006, a contribution that was
explicitly asked for by NATO, Minister of Defense Anne-Grete Strøm
Erichsen defended the decision by stating that “Norwegian special oper-
ations forces would not make a significant difference.”155 The decision not
to send additional forces to Afghanistan was a political trade-off to the left
wing of the coalition government. Other NATO countries face the same
political realities. Regardless of political challenges, nothing seems to dis-
miss the fact that NATO will continue to constitute the cornerstone in
Norwegian security policy.
The EU is an important political actor in Europe and for Norway, but
I do not yet consider it a major military actor. Norway has truly signed
an agreement to participate in the EU’s new Battle Group concept, and
also participates with personnel in the EU’s continuing operation in
Bosnia, Operation Althea.156 But Norway is still not part of the EU, and
the EU is still working to formulate its security policy concept as a real-
istic alternative to NATO and the US.157 The current Government is also
committed through a common political compromise, the Soria Moria
declaration, not to apply for EU-membership in the current period. The
EU is thus not yet an important military factor for deriving new roles and
missions for NORSOF.
The US plays an important albeit ambiguous role in Norwegian se-
curity policy. During the Cold War, a close bilateral relation to the US,
as an ally within NATO, was fairly unproblematic. Despite national re-
strictions on the Alliance, Norwegian air bases were prepared for rapid de-
ployment of US air assets (the COB agreement), and equipment for a
complete brigade size reaction force was forward-deployed in Trønde-
lag.158 Due to its proximity to the Soviet Union and the naval bases on the
Kola Peninsula, an extensive intelligence collaboration program
developed. Both nations benefited from this cooperation; the US had early
access to signal intelligence, and Norway had access to US technology. In
154 Jarle Brenna, “Danmark kritiserer Norges NATO-nei” [Denmark criticizes Norway’s
no to NATO], Verdens Gang, 25 November 2006 [online 27 Nov 2006].
155 “– Norske spesialstyrker utgjør ingen stor forskjell” [Norwegian Special Operations
Forces do not make a huge difference] Aftenposten, 13 November 2006 [online 27 Nov
2006].
156 Forsvarsdepartementet, “Avtale om EU-innsatsstyrke signert i Brussel” [Agreement
on EU Reaction Force Signed in Brussels], Odin (Ministry of Defense [online 6 Jan
2006]).
157 Jahn Otto Johansen, “NATO og de transatlantiske motsetninger – kortsiktige og
langsiktige perspektiver” [NATO and transatlantic contrasts – short and long term
perspectives], Det sikkerhetspolitiske bibliotek, no. 3 (2004): 8 (The Norwegian Atlantic
Committee [online 22 Aug 2005]).
158 Finn Molvig, “Norsk forsvarspolitikk i 1970- og 80-årene” [Norwegian defense pol-
icy in the 1970s and 80s] IFS Info, no. 4 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defense
Studies, 1994).
Making New Ambitions Work 61addition, keeping close ties to the US reinforced the notion of Norway as
an important ally.159
The collapse of the Soviet Union changed this relationship. Norway
does not enjoy the same status as an important flank in America’s strate-
gy.160 An alternative scenario is instead that US and Russian cooperation
on petroleum issues could lead to a marginalization of Norwegian terri-
torial interests in the Barents region. It is therefore uncertain how far
Norway might rally support from the US in case of a more serious terri-
torial dispute. 
As by far the largest contributor to the Alliance, the US is neverthe-
less held as the guarantor of NATO’s continuous existence. If NATO
should fail and disintegrate in the foreseeable future, most likely if the EU
were to establish an alternative through its European Defense Agency,
Norway could face a strategic choice: either to integrate with the EU’s de-
fense alternative or to establish a bilateral defense pact with the US. Ac-
cording to several commentators the former is not a very realistic
option.161 Relevant Force does not exaggerate the political effects of the de-
bacle that occurred between European actors and the US in the run-up to
the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Rather, it is of “utmost importance to Norway
that NATO’s role as a transatlantic forum for consultation be strength-
ened.”162 The participation of Norwegian Special Operations Forces in
Operation Enduring Freedom between 2001 and 2005 could then be
evaluated as strategically important to maintain this relationship. The
political effect is probably more important than the military. In this per-
spective, Norwegian Special Operations Forces’ strategic utility is of high
value. 
As stated above, the current government (Stoltenberg II) has signaled
a change of priorities in order to give more support to the UN. State Sec-
retary Espen Barth Eide, in a speech at the Norwegian Army War College
in December 2005, stated that the new government would increasingly
emphasize peace operations, particularly on the African continent. Inter-
national deployments will be diverted from US-led “coalitions of the will-
ing” in favor of multilateral organizations like NATO, UN, and the EU.
The new government will “to a larger degree prioritize Army units for in-
ternational operations. This objective will be achieved by assigning Navy
and Air Force capabilities to NATO and EU’s standby forces, like NATO
NRF.”163 Barth Eide indirectly suggests that NATO Response Forces are
159 Rolf Tamnes, “Norges hemmelige tjenester under den kalde krigen – et sammen-
liknende internasjonalt perspektiv” [Norwegian Secret Services during the Cold War
– a Comparative International Perspective] IFS Info, no. 2 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute
for Defence Studies, 1992).
160 Forsvarsdepartementet, “Relevant Force”: 39. 
161 Johansen, “NATO og de transatlantiske motsetninger”.
162 Forsvarsdepartementet, “Relevant Force”: 39. 
163 Eide, Ny regjering – ny sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikk? author’s translation.
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up assets that otherwise could be used in peace operations. Accordingly,
the NRF concept does not allow for national forces being used optimally
for foreign policy purposes. 
Whether Eide’s speech should be interpreted as strategic guidelines
is open to debate. But it is by far the clearest and most current strategic
guidance there is along with the Soria Moria declaration (the manifesto of
the current government). According to the manifesto, the government
wants to increase the emphasis on societal security, change priorities from
the US-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to NATO’s operation in
Afghanistan, emphasize the main role of the Norwegian Armed Forces as
maintaining national sovereignty and secure stability in Norway’s imme-
diate surroundings and maintain a large presence of military forces in
Northern Norway.164 Based on this list, the following goals should guide
future NORSOF roles and missions:
1. Protect national interests, primarily the oil and gas infra-
structure, in the Norwegian Economic Zone.
2. Contribute to maintaining a coherent NATO through par-
ticipation in Alliance operations and standing force contri-
butions.
3. Maintain a coherent and credible UN through participating 
in peace operations to promote peace and stability in trou-
bled regions.
The order of priority is assumed to be based on state security, societal se-
curity, and human security. 
Summary: Security through NATO
The current security environment is normally explained in a national and
an international context. In the national context, threats to state security
through conventional war are assessed as negligible, at least in the short
term. Disputes over sovereign rights with emphasis on the Barents region
are instead the main area of concern. Recent events in the region demon-
strate the disputed nature of this area. Jurisdiction in the Norwegian Eco-
nomic Zone is primarily a Naval responsibility. The Army maintains
jurisdiction on the Russian border which is part of EU’s Schengen agree-
ment. The threat to the border is first and foremost associated with organ-
ized crime.
In an international context, terrorism, failed and rogue states, and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are the dominant threats to
international stability. Threats to societal security are first and foremost
164 “Plattform for regjeringssamarbeidet …” 
Making New Ambitions Work 63associated with international terrorism. There have so far been no terror
incidents in Norway or against Norwegian interests abroad. National se-
curity authorities assert, however, that it can be only a matter of time be-
fore Scandinavia will be hit. 
In the larger scheme, conflict patterns have changed, indicating a
shift from conventional interstate wars towards intrastate wars with re-
gional or global spillover effects. A significant trend is that civilians are
increasingly targeted by the combatants. 
There is no coherent military strategy from which NORSOF roles
and missions can be easily derived. Therefore, existing practice and recent
political statements are used to grasp the essence of a national military
strategy. For the purpose of state survival, Norway’s predominant strate-
gy continues to be remaining a credible Ally in NATO. Only through ac-
tive participation can this credibility be maintained. NATO is vital for
national interests, hence Alliance cohesion is important. Only a continu-
ous US presence and interest in the Alliance can maintain this cohesion.
The EU is not yet considered a viable alternative to NATO.
Operations in Afghanistan through ISAF seem to be Norway’s main
focus in the forthcoming years. UN operations, especially in Africa, will
increasingly be emphasized. Participation in UN operations will be con-
ducted primarily with Army units. To maintain NATO obligations, Na-
val and Air Force units will increasingly be assigned to stand by for
NATO’s Response Force.

Chapter 4Future Roles and Missions
In this chapter the Norwegian Special Operations Forces’ current and fu-
ture roles and missions will be evaluated. In the discussion, principal spe-
cial operations forces’ approaches to warfare through direct and indirect
capabilities as outlined by Tucker and Lamb will be emphasized.165 The
intent is not to cover the complete spectrum of tactical missions but to
focus on what are perceived and assessed as characteristic roles within each
approach. The strategic value of Norwegian Special Operations Forces
will also be addressed. The main question under consideration is what
might be possible and appropriate roles and missions for NORSOF in the
future.
In the last section of the chapter issues of future transformation will
be discussed. So far, it appears that the inconsistency stated in the hypoth-
esis stems from a lack of strategic guidance and a separation of roles more
than from violations of the principles of transformation: Is the current or-
ganization inconsistent with future roles and missions?
Expanding Roles and Missions
An important precondition for this discussion is that future roles and mis-
sions are derived from expected future threats. As such, possible threats
in the future are not based on current wars, although lessons learned from
current operations certainly apply. In other words, previous experience
from Operation Enduring Freedom and the Balkan Wars are not the only
conditions that should shape future roles and missions. If this were the
case, a strategic perspective on transformation would be meaningless.
History also suggests that drawing conclusions based on past experiences
for future strategies might be inappropriate.
One approach with which to analyze emerging missions is to look at
the total spectrum of military missions and roles, determine which mis-
sions are maintained by conventional forces, and subsequently assign mis-
sions and roles to NORSOF to fill the “gap”. There are two principal
165 Tucker and Lamb, “Restructuring Special Operations Forces …”: 1–6.
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rent Chief of Defense indicates that the principle of maintaining a bal-
anced defense structure is no longer relevant. Hence the gap is probably
already too large or too complex for NORSOF to fill. In addition, to op-
erationalize the concept (a balanced defense structure) in itself might be a
challenge. Second, the emphasis on international operations pressures
Norway to participate with certain capabilities. The common doctrinal
denominator is NATO. Hence future missions and roles must be in ac-
cordance, or at least not in conflict, with NATO’s doctrines.
Roles and missions must be seen in a national and international con-
text. For operations in a national context, the spectrum of operations com-
prises peace, crisis, and war. A grey zone certainly exists between the
stages. A deeper analysis of this grey zone is beyond the scope of this
study. The international context has two important factors, NATO and
the UN. The spectrum of NATO operations is defined as Article 5 and
non-Article 5 operations (Crisis Response Operations). UN operations are
defined as Peace Support Operations.166 This framework is illustrated in
Table 4.
The National Context
To begin this discussion, it is useful to refer to the following statement in
Relevant Force: 
The use of military force by Norway in a purely national context
is first and foremost an option in limited situations, connected
to the exercise of national sovereignty and authority. In all other
situations, the Norwegian Armed Forces will operate in a multi-
national framework – both inside and outside of Norway.167 
166 AJP-01(B) chapter 22, section III, distinguishes between Peace Support Operations
in Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement. This article does not make this distinction
because the focus is on the impartial aspect of UN operations. Whether operations are
offensive or defensive is deemed less relevant.
Spectrum of Operations
National Peace Crisis War
Nato Crisis Response Operations Article 5
UN Peace Support Operations
Table 4: Framework for defining new roles,
167 Forsvarsdepartementet, “Relevant Force”.
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of war – the military has a limited role in times of peace. In such times, it
follows from Relevant Force that missions and roles are limited to issues
concerning the maintenance of national sovereignty and authority.
Whenever the military is used outside its primary role, this will occur
within the context of other ministries, most likely the Ministry of Justice
and the Police. This pertains to the Coastguard maintaining national in-
terests in the Norwegian Economic Zone, the Army’s expanded Schengen
mission on the Norwegian-Russian border, and Hærens Jegerkomman-
do’s (HJK) national, counterterrorist task.168 
The Elektron incident might illustrate other types of operations or sce-
narios which involve special operations’ supporting conventional forces
maintaining national jurisdiction. The Marinejegerkommando (MJK) is
capable of boarding ships to support maritime interdict operations.169
This role is useful support to the Coastguard, but also politically chal-
lenging.170
Missions outside national borders in peacetime or times of crisis could
include protection or evacuation of national citizens in distress. The reac-
tions to the row about some cartoons in 2005 – a series of pictures illus-
trating the prophet Mohammad first published in the Danish newspaper
Jyllands Tidende – included the burning of the Norwegian Embassy in
Syria.171 In addition, piracy is still a problem for the shipping industry,
and Norwegian-flagged ships and their crewmembers have recently been
targeted. Such missions, to the extent they are politically feasible, would
fall into the direct action spectrum of capabilities. Where required and
authorized, NORSOF support could thus be utilized to maintain national
interests where civilian authorities lack the capability.
Using the Norwegian Armed Forces to uphold national jurisdiction
is no simple matter. According to the national newspaper Verdens Gang,
Chief of Defense General Diesen is critical of the increased focus on the
military’s role in the Barents Sea. Gunboat diplomacy, he claims, can only
be effective if Norway is guaranteed mutual political and military support
from its allies. Without this support, diplomacy involving the threat of
force lacks credibility.172 The Chief of Defense’s concerns seems reasona-
ble all the time military support is based on the contributions of the same
168 See Merete Voreland, “Utfordringer i norske kyst og havområder” [Challenges in
Norwegian Maritime Areas], Forsvarsnett (Norwegian Defense [online 17 Jan]; Fors-
varsdepartementet, “Forsvarets bistand til Politiet” [Armed Forces Support to
Police], Odin (Ministry of Defense [online 17 jan 2006]; Forsvarsdepartementet, Lov
1997-06-13 nr 42: Lov om Kystvakten (Kystvaktloven), Lovdata [online 11 Dec].
169 Det nye Sjøforsvaret: Omstilling i Sjøforsvaret 2004–2010, p. 5.
170 Børresen, Gjeseth, and Tamnes, Norsk Forsvarshistorie, p. 381.
171 Kristin Welle-Strand, “Ambassaden i Syria brent ned” [Embassy in Syria burnt
down], Verdens Gang, 4 February 2006 [online 20 Mar 2006].
172 Tom Bakkeli and Alf B. Johnsen, “Advarte mot militær maktbruk” [Warned against
use of military force], Verdens Gang, 14 January 2006 [online 1 Feb 2006].
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nations and Iceland. Russia is excluded in this context.
There has also proven to be tension between the military and civilian
authorities, primarily the police. Truls Fyhn, Chief of Police in Tromsø,
claimed as a reaction to the Elektron incident that the police’s own coun-
terterrorist unit, Beredskapstroppen, had the capability to handle jurisdic-
tional incidents requiring the use of force, including supporting the
Coastguard.173 Whether or not Fyhn was right regarding such tactical
capability is not within this study’s remit, although it might be men-
tioned that it is clear that the police do not have the necessary tactical
mobility to execute complex missions offshore without military support.
This is why HJK was assigned the offshore counterterrorism task in the
first place. Fyhn’s argument could thus be part of an intra-sectorial de-
bate for increased resources. On the other hand, tensions seem to have de-
creased in the aftermath of Elektron and may be less than Fyhn asserted.
State Secretary Eide asserted in a speech at the University of Stavanger in
January 2006 that Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Justice and Police
had initiated intra-sectorial discussions to better coordinate available re-
sources, and this in part was based on the Elektron incident.174
Nevertheless, a grey zone does exists between the police and the mil-
itary. An occupied oil platform in the NEZ is geographically confined
within Norwegian jurisdictional territory, but outside the reach of reg-
ular police duties. Using HJK in a designated role in such a scenario
seems fairly unproblematic. However, it is uncertain to what extent Nor-
wegian Special Operations Forces can be assigned specific roles beyond
offshore scenarios. The counterargument is that available assets should
be used whenever the situation dictates. Should a more dangerous and
destructive type of terrorism arise than the initial offshore scenario was
intended to counter, the existing legal framework might prove obsolete
when put to test. Both HJK, with its counterterrorism task, and MJK
supporting the Coastguard represent redundant national capabilities. 
NORSOF’s role in support of national authority outside national bor-
ders, noncombatant evacuation operations and hostage rescue seems clear-
er. The wellbeing of its citizens abroad is one inherent responsibility of
the nation state, maintained by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Given the
size of the Norwegian military, such operations are likely to be a joint ef-
fort between several countries. It follows from AJP-01(B) that NATO or
NATO forces could ally to initiate such operations.175 International expe-
173 “Beredskapstroppen Burde Stoppet ‘Elektron’” [Police Delta Force should have
stopped ‘Elektron’], Verdens Gang, 18 Dec. 2005 [online 10 Jan 2006].
174 Espen Barth Eide, “Samfunnssikkerhet og nye trusselbilder” [Societal Security and
New threats], speech at the University of Stavanger, Stavanger, 9 January 2006, Odin
(Ministry of Defense [online 30 Nov 2006]).
175 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(B), para 2230.
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special operations forces, and such a role should also thus be applicable to
Norwegian Special Operations Forces. Such scenarios can be exemplified
by the kidnapping of the Norwegian UN observer Knut Gjellestad in Si-
erra Leone in 2000. Gjellestad was eventually rescued in a British opera-
tion that most likely involved the use of British SOF.176 Because failed or
rogue states continue to exist, especially on the African continent, and
radical terrorist groups deliberately target Western citizens, both mis-
sions are likely to emerge in the future.
In war, NORSOF’s direct action capabilities will still apply. Insofar
as a military threat or situation exists, traditional roles will probably be
as applicable in the future as they were during the Cold War. New con-
cepts of warfare, such as network centric warfare, effects-based operations,
or information operations, and adaptation to new technology certainly ap-
ply to Norwegian Special Operations Forces and to the Armed Forces in
general. However, this will not affect special operations per se, apart from
the fact that they will have to implement and adapt to emerging technol-
ogy and new concepts. 
Although Norwegian Special Operations Forces can conduct inde-
pendent missions in the operational or strategic realm, their mission po-
tential is arguably highest in conjunction with conventional operations.
This assertion seems reasonable knowing that the overall strength of the
military, in terms of maneuver units, has been significantly reduced since
the Cold War. Likewise, conventional units increasingly adapt better
technology and weapons systems, network centric warfare being an exam-
ple, further reinforcing the necessity to be able to support joint opera-
tions. Special operation forces are already playing a key role in
conventional campaigns. The integration of special operations forces with
air force is often considered to be the successful formula behind the top-
pling of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in 2001. In a national context,
within the next five to ten years Norway will have modernized its entire
Navy.177 It thus seems important for Norwegian Special Operations Forc-
es to continue to cooperate with the conventional parts of the military,
not only to gain support for their own operations, but for instance also to
support Naval operations in the littoral. The same logic will apply to new
concepts within land and air warfare. 
Indirect capabilities, as described by doctrine, are less likely to be ap-
plicable in war on national territory. The primary role will be to apply
Special Operations Forces’ direct action capabilities. However, there is
one exception which consists of acting in an advisory role for allied units,
176 “Hensynsløse soldater holder Gjellestad som gissel” [Ruthless soldiers keep Gjelles-
tad hostage], Verdens Gang, 11 May 2000 [online 7 Feb 2006].
177 Ole M. Rapp, “Får Europas beste marine” [The best Navy in Europe], Aftenposten, 4
February 2005 [online 17 Jan 2006].
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have proven less capable of operating independently in Norway, especial-
ly during the winter. According to US Special Operations Command, in
Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, coalition warfare – warfighting
with forces from more than one nation – “was arguably the most impor-
tant of all the SOCCENT [Special Operations Command Central] mis-
sions.”178 The advisory role was assigned to both SEALs and to the Fifth
Special Forces Group. Because NATO no longer pre-designates units for
Article 5 operations, Norway cannot know in advance which units will be
deployed as reinforcements for Article 5 operations. Coalition warfare
should therefore apply to Norwegian Special Operations Forces as a mis-
sion. This role is not new to NORSOF, as training and exercises involving
foreign units has been carried out for years.
Missions and roles as derived above all fall under special operations
forces direct action capabilities. Given the previous discussion, it seems
necessary to clarify NORSOF roles vis-à-vis the police. To tie up scarce
military resources for a national readiness capability that is not in demand
seems less prudent. National readiness has ramifications for NORSOF’s
capability to deploy for international operations. What is most cost-effec-
tive from a strategic perspective – being on standby for national counter-
terrorism scenarios that have never occurred, or on standby for
deployments for international commitments – is hard to tell. But it is re-
alistic to expect that a unit cannot be two places at the same time. 
I have defined NORSOF’s strategic role as promoting national
foreign policy objectives. This role is not defined by doctrine.
Vanderbrouche defines strategic special operations forces’ missions as of-
fensive strikes seeking to achieve foreign policy objectives, citing the Bay
of Pigs and the 1980 attempt to rescue US embassy personnel in Iran as
examples.179 According to Vanderbrouche, a national Hostage Rescue ca-
pability falls within the strategic realm.
Whether Norway, with its current foreign policy ambitions, has the
political and military will to conduct such strikes is questionable. Dr. Ri-
chard H. Shultz Jr., longtime analyst of and writer about military affairs,
questions whether even the US dare use its special operations forces in a
strategic offensive role for national purposes. Prior to 9/11, President
Clinton signed several presidential directives targeting Osama bin Lad-
en’s Al Qaeda network. Despite the political will, in most cases the Pen-
tagon was reluctant to conduct special operations for this purpose.180 This
runs contrary to the belief that politicians are more reluctant to use mili-
tary force than the military itself, and also reinforces the necessity for spe-
178 US Special Operations Command,, United States Special Operations Command: History
(Tampa, FL: USSOCOM, 2002), p. 37.
179 Vandenbroucke, Perilous Options.
180 Shultz Jr., “Nine Reasons …”
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Norwegian Special Operations Forces to actually represent a strategic al-
ternative.
Much changed after 9/11, both in the US and in Norway. Schulz
might not worry just as much today about the US’ willingness to deploy
its SOF operators to capture or kill terrorists almost wherever they might
be. Whether it is possible to authorize a covert, strategic special operation
at prime-ministerial level, or whether Norway possess the necessary assets
to conduct such an operation, is outside the scope of this study. Neverthe-
less, national strategic strikes will most likely be conducted within an Al-
liance or coalition context. Although NATO is defined as a political as
well as military organization, its role as a foreign policy instrument is at
best limited to Alliance consensus. With the exception of a potential hos-
tage rescue scenario, it is unclear to what extent Norway can garner suffi-
cient support within the Alliance to pursue national foreign policy
objectives. Hans Binnendijk, Director of the Center for Technology and
National Security Policy at the National Defense University, claims that
unless NATO develops a NATO Special Operations Forces concept
broadly modeled on the US Special Operations Command concept,
NATO Special Operations Forces will not in themselves constitute a stra-
tegic resource.181 NORSOF’s role as a strike force pursuing national for-
eign policy objectives is thus limited by national constraints, political as
well as logistic. 
Strategic utility, however, might be achieved by other means. In
Commandos and Politicians, Dr. Eliot Cohen suggests three motivations for
the creation, nurturance, and deployment of elite military units: military
utility, the rather romantic image of war, and political utility.182 While
Cohen’s definition of military utility and the romantic image of war
might not be useful concepts with which to understand strategic utility
in the way I have defined it, his discussion about political utility is more
promising. Cohen suggests that “small, discrete military actions can be
used to signal to a number of audiences (an opposing government, its
population, one’s own population) threats, commitments, and intents.”183
NORSOF’s deployment to Afghanistan late 2001 is an example of such a
signaling effort. While this might have been unintentional (the mission
was initially a low profile deployment), the deployment clearly signaled
national will and commitment to both domestic and international audi-
ences. Deploying Norwegian Special Operations Forces indicated a policy
181 Hans Binnendijk, David C. Gompert and Richard L. Kugler, “A New Military
Framework for NATO”, Defense Horizons, no. 48 (May 2005)(Center for Technology
and National Security Policy, National Defense University [online 8 Feb 2006]).
182 Eliot A. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians (Cambridge, Mass: Center for International
Affairs, Harvard University, 1978), p. 136.
183 Ibid., p. 49.
72 Defence and Security Studies 1-2007shift which entailed Norway deploying offensive units intended for com-
bat operations. Whether political opponents agreed with the decision is
irrelevant. NORSOF brought national values and colors to the fight. By
deploying a capable and relevant force, the Government achieved this ef-
fect while simultaneously lowering the political risk; the military foot-
print was low, yet capable; the standard of the forces was high, hence the
probability of success was equally high. Using Special Operations Forces
in this role could thus be interpreted as pursuing foreign policy objec-
tives. 
This effect is not necessarily exclusive to Norwegian Special Opera-
tions Forces, as other units were deployed more or less simultaneously.
Later in 2002, F-16s were deployed, and mine clearance troops were de-
ployed before NORSOF in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.
But NORSOF was the first Norwegian combat unit to be deployed and
utilized. A “signaling” role contradicts the low profile generally sought
in conjunction with special operations, and is thus open to question. This
role could, however, as Cohen suggests, be a deliberate political choice.
Thus it seems unclear to what extent Norwegian Special Operations
Forces are a strategic asset beyond the military domain. Gray asserts that
special operations forces only “have strategic meaning … with reference
to war, or other kinds of conflict, as a whole.”184 While Vandenbroucke
disagrees, the question is whether Norway is willing or capable to use
NORSOF for strategic purposes, i.e., to pursue policy objectives. The dis-
cussion above suggests that NORSOF’s strategic impact is low except for
a potential signaling effect, an effect that might also be attributed to con-
ventional units.
A principal arrangement of NORSOF missions in a national context
could be depicted according to table 5.
184 Gray, Explorations in Strategy, p. 143.
Spectrum of Operations
Peace Crisis War
Direct Action
Capabilities
Counterterrorism,
Jurisdiction NEZ (Coast 
Guard)
Counterterrorism,
Jurisdiction NEZ (Navy), Hos-
tage Rescue, Noncombatant 
Evacuation Operations
Direct Action, Special 
Reconnaissance and 
Surveillance
Indirect Action
Capabilities
Coalition Warfare
Table 5: NORSOF missions and roles in a national context.
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NATO operations can broadly be defined as consisting of Article 5
and Crisis Response Operations. The previous discussion of national
roles in war pertains to Article 5 operations as well, since Article 5
concerns territorial defense. It can thus be concluded that the discus-
sion of national roles in times of war applies to NATO and Article 5.
For territorial defense purposes, NORSOF’s current direct action
capabilities therefore apply. 
The extent to which NATO’s Response Force (NRF) may be activat-
ed beyond Article 5 operations remains to be seen. It is clear, however,
that NRF is intended as an initial-entry, a “first in, first out” expedition-
ary force with capabilities within the complete spectrum of operations.185
To what extent the latter is true depends on the definition of the complete
spectrum. With few exceptions, the various NATO countries developed
the same kind of forces as Norway during the Cold War. With this in
mind, the complete spectrum of operations emphasizes traditional defen-
sive/offensive maneuver warfare with concentration of military effort as
the center of gravity, rather than asymmetric warfare in low intensity con-
flicts where popular support should be the center of gravity.186 Given
NRF’s role as an expeditionary force, its modus operandi is likely to re-
quire special operations forces direct action capabilities. NORSOF’s di-
rect action capabilities will therefore continue to prove relevant in an
NRF context. 
Although NATO’s strategic concept implies that threats will be met
before reaching Alliance territory, it is less likely that NATO will initiate
preventive operations. The negative reactions from European statesmen
to the US concept of preventive war as stated by Bush after 2001, might
indicate how Europe intends to use NATO for emerging threats. Offen-
sive “War by Consensus” is inherently more challenging than its defen-
sive counterpart. Non-Article 5 conditions, or Crisis Response
Operations, are therefore likely to apply to most, if not all, out-of-area op-
erations. 
This leaves Norway with an option regarding redefining future
NORSOF roles and missions, because Crisis Response Operations (CRO)
are based on national interests, and not Alliance requirements. “[U]nlike
Collective Defence operations, there is no automatic commitment of forc-
es for non-Article 5 CRO …”187 Further, “[a] nation’s level of interest in
a non-Article 5 CRO may vary in relation to its national strategic interest
185 NATO, Improving Capabilities to Meet New Threats (Brussels, 2004) (NATO [online 27
Feb 2006]), p. 9.
186  According to Dr. Gordon McCormick, Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California. Dr. McCormick claims this view to be the major challenge to a
successful US strategy in current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
187 NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(B), para 2204.
74 Defence and Security Studies 1-2007in the operation. Therefore, national commitment to provide forces will
vary accordingly …”188 Given the low probability of Article 5 scenarios
in today’s Euro-Atlantic area, this suggests that NORSOF should adapt
new roles to stay militarily relevant beyond Article 5. 
According to Scheffer, NATO’s core mission remains collective de-
fense, but he also asserts that NATO should be used for non-military mis-
sions, like nation building.189 Special operation forces in general and
Norwegian Special Operations Forces in particular could certainly play a
key role at this lower end of the conflict scale. From US experience, low
intensity conflicts have traditionally been a niche capability of special op-
erations forces.190 Although direct action capabilities are applicable in low
intensity scenarios, indirect capabilities have traditionally proven more
effective against insurgents and irregular opponents. The latter is exem-
plified by the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. When the pre-
ferred strategy aims at restoring peace rather than conquering territory,
an indirect approach to win hearts and minds becomes essential.191
The essence of the indirect approach as used in this study is to work
by, with, and through an indigenous force or population to gain tactical
and strategic advantages. As per NATO doctrine, Military Assistance as
an indirect approach includes two tasks defined in US doctrine as Uncon-
ventional Warfare and Foreign Internal Defense. 
As chapter 2 showed, it is clear that Norwegian Special Operations
Forces is not traditionally focused on the indirect spectrum of special op-
erations capabilities. Because most contemporary conflicts pertain to the
low intensity range of the scale, and because this trend will probably con-
tinue for the foreseeable future, changing focus could increase NORSOF’s
flexibility and relevance. Military Assistance is thus applicable, whether
this role supports the host government (Foreign Internal Defense) or aims
at the village level (Unconventional Warfare). The US special forces are
widely used in this role in Afghanistan and Iraq. In a broad sense, the
Norwegian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Meymaneh, Afghani-
stan, is part of a strategy utilizing indirect capabilities, as they are defined
in this study. While the Provincial Reconstruction Team is run by con-
ventional units, there is no reason why Norwegian Special Operations
Forces could not contribute in an advisory role in remote or high-threat
areas, or where a large conventional footprint is impossible or undesirable.
In a NATO context, conventional forces do not seem to have this capabil-
ity.192 
188 Ibid., para 2209.
189 de Hoop Scheffer, “Keeping NATO Relevant …”
190 Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action.
191 Nigel Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations”, Mili-
tary Review (November–December, 2005): 2–15. Aylwin-Foster criticizes the US
Army’s tendency to place too much emphasis on offensive approaches to destroying
Iraqi insurgents in later phases of OIF. 
Making New Ambitions Work 75While the Taleban continue to exist as an alternative to the Afghan
government, counterinsurgency strategies must necessarily be NATO’s
preferred reaction. The steady rise of Afghan insurgency will have to be
faced by NATO. If NORSOF are assigned roles within the complete
spectrum of Military Assistance, this will likely increase the relevancy of
NORSOF as a niche capability in NATO. 
Roles and missions in a NATO context as discussed above are exem-
plified in table 6. Important about this figure is that Direct Action Op-
erations are also in demand in Crisis Response Operations. These missions
are, however, excluded from the figure for explanatory purposes mainly
because this ideally should not be a primary task in such operations.
NATO doctrine broadly divides Military Assistance into two separate
tasks, with Unconventional Warfare/Foreign internal defense as one task
and Peace Support Operations the other. These tasks can be broadly dis-
tinguished by the relationship to the host nation or the belligerents. Act-
ing in the first role, the operation supports one side in a conflict, either
the existing government or its opponent. Conversely, in Peace Opera-
tions, the operation ideally does not support any side, but rather works to
stabilize the conflict. Peace Support Operations can be divided into
Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement, depending on the nature of the
conflict, and to what extent the belligerents accept the stabilizing force.
Current government statements clarify that Norway will increasingly
focus its military support on UN operations. While discussing potential
force contributions to a possible future mission in Sudan, State Secretary
Barth-Eide claimed that Norway did not have forces with the necessary
competence to participate in UN operations.193 However, he claimed that
Norway could deploy command and control capabilities, intelligence, en-
gineering units, along with “capable combat elements like mechanized
infantry and special operations forces.”194 In one sense, this is a mispercep-
192 Michael Smith, “Afghan Posting ‘Too Dangerous’ for Dutch Army”, Sunday Times, 20
Nov 2005 [online 18 Jan 2006].
Spectrum of Operations
Article 5 Crisis Response Operations
Direct Action
Capabilities
Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance 
and Surveillance
Indirect Action
Capabilities
Military Assistance (Includes the US 
term Foreign Internal Defense and 
Unconventional Warfare)
Table 6: NORSOF missions and roles in a NATO context.
193 Marita I. Wangberg, “Nordisk samarbeid om FN-bidrag” [Nordic cooperation on
UN participation], Forsvarsnett (Norwegian Defense [online 18 Jan 2006]).
194 Eide, Ny regjering – ny sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikk? author’s translation.
76 Defence and Security Studies 1-2007tion of the general capabilities special operations forces can bring to the
operation, and clearly amplifies NORSOF’s traditional emphasis on di-
rect action capabilities. Given the Sudanese government’s reluctance to
accept a Western-dominated UN peace force, proposing offensive capa-
bilities seems less prudent. The main concern should nevertheless be that
Norwegian Special Operations Forces are primarily intended as an offen-
sive capability. NORSOF are thus not an obvious choice to offer the UN. 
Whether NORSOF represents a capability intended to deploy for
UN operations, or whether the UN actually wants special operations forc-
es capabilities as part of their operations, is of less relevance in this study.
If missions are appropriate for special operations forces in the first place,
it seems less important whether the operation is led by the UN or NATO
as long as it meets Norway’s political and strategic objectives. NORSOF’s
existing offensive capabilities should thus be applicable given the scenario
and adopted strategy requires this capability. By virtue of their status,
Norwegian Special Operations Forces have certain tactical capabilities
that should be technically relevant in a UN context: a small organization-
al footprint, a substantial command and control capability, and enhanced
medical capability. These capabilities make NORSOF well suited for in-
itial entry operations, area assessments, and operations not dependent on
a large conventional presence. NORSOF’s intelligence capabilities could
certainly be utilized to establish early warning indicators, although this
might require skills beyond those deemed necessary during the Cold War
(Urban Operations, language and cultural knowledge). 
Increasing the emphasis on indirect capabilities would allow more
flexible NORSOF participation, whether in a NATO or UN context.
Utilizing special operations’ indirect capabilities would, however, require
increased emphasis on the social, political, and cultural aspects of a con-
flict, which again must be embedded in the chosen strategy. It is prudent
to cite Adams, who claims that guerrilla warfare is a tactic, and insurgen-
cy is a political condition.195 Counterinsurgency is thus a chosen strategy
and not a tactic. 
Applying and utilizing indirect force capabilities effectively require
prior training and mental preparation. This is not acquired overnight, al-
though this is a common misperception amongst many officers. Special
operation forces do not automatically qualify for Military Assistance,
whether in terms of Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense,
or Peace Support Operations.196 
195 Adams, US Special Operations Forces In Action, p. 46.
196 See Tucker and Lamb, “Restructuring Special Operations Forces …”: 1–6.
Making New Ambitions Work 77NORSOF’s potential missions and roles in Peace Support Operations
are depicted in table 7.
Implications
Two questions emerge from the discussion above. First, is increased em-
phasis on indirect action capabilities as described above, desirable or nec-
essary? Second, can direct action and indirect action capabilities be
developed within the context of a single unit? 
Indirect action capabilities are not necessary for national defense pur-
poses, and given the priorities for security, direct action capabilities
should continue to be NORSOF’s primary focus. Accepting that interna-
tional cooperation is vital for national defense purposes does not alter this
assertion. However, national security is a function of international coop-
eration, which is maintained primarily under a NATO umbrella. Because
current NATO operations are conducted under non-Article 5 conditions,
where protracted conflicts are the problem, indirect capabilities will in-
creasingly be demanded or preferred. Norway’s emphasis on UN opera-
tions will reinforce this demand. Norwegian Special Operations Forces
will increasingly be involved in conflicts where population control, im-
partiality, human rights, and controlled use of force are keywords. By fo-
cusing on indirect action capabilities, NORSOF will continue to be
relevant. Also, by maintaining its direct action capabilities, NORSOF
will continue to be flexible. The answer to the first question, then, should
initially be yes.
Can both direct and indirect action capabilities be maintained within
a single unit? The answer is not obvious. Increasingly, combatants must
be able to switch between high intensity combat and humanitarian assist-
ance, all within the same mission. It is a challenging task, and one that
few conventional units are traditionally trained for.197 Within the US
SOF community, army’s Special Forces have indirect action capabilities as
their primary task, while the Navy SEALs have direct action capabilities
as their primary role. Yet historically both units have first and foremost
been used in direct action roles. According to Adams, army’s Special Forc-
Spectrum of Operations
Peace Support Operations
Direct Action
Capabilities
Initial Entry (Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance and Surveillance)
Indirect Action
Capabilities
Intelligence Collection, Command and Control, Medical and Technical assistance
Table 7: NORSOF missions and roles in an UN context.
197 Max Boot, “The Struggle to Transform the Military”, Foreign Affairs, March/April
(2005): 103–118.
78 Defence and Security Studies 1-2007es actually prefer direct action roles to indirect action roles. One possible
explanation is that missions requiring indirect action capabilities are
“very hard to define and prepare for.”198 The US military experience in Vi-
etnam illustrates what happens when a direct action approach is consist-
ently applied to an enemy who just as consistently refuses to fight on
those terms. The current Iraqi conflict also demonstrates that convention-
al military strategies and tactics might prove ineffective against a fero-
cious insurgency.199 
Tucker and Lamb claim that it is essential to distinguish between the
two special operations forces approaches in order to keep focus on the in-
direct action spectrum of tasks. Not only is it necessary to distinguish
roles at the tactical level, i.e., which unit is assigned to which capability,
but separate strategic command elements are also required. Only by vir-
tue of a division such as this will an indirect approach (military assistance,
in NATO terms) receive the proper attention.200 
Division at the strategic level is neither possible nor desirable for
Norway because of several reasons, including national ambitions and the
size of the forces involved. But Tucker and Lamb’s argument underscores
that an offensive nature does not imply excellence or even competence
within the key concept of Military Assistance. Adams shares this view.201 
British SOF, on the other hand, do not seem to distinguish between
direct/indirect capabilities to the same degree as the US. This claim is less
documented in literature, although British SOF participated in counter-
insurgency operations in Malaya, Kenya, and Oman. The British way of
war is, however, distinguished from the Americans’ first of all due to the
British experience in the former colonies. Unlike the US approach, the
British one has traditionally treated insurgency as a political condition,
which again is the basis for strategic choices. The post-World War II Ma-
layan counterinsurgency campaign is often held up as a successful model
in this regard. Colonial warfare, which largely focused on joint civil/mil-
itary strategies, has thus shaped contemporary British doctrine.202 British
SOF are therefore integrated and utilized differently in British doctrine
than are their US counterparts.
Is British experience and practice a better model than that of the US?
I have no clearcut answer to this question. With respect to the British
and US experience, their former experience in counterinsurgency opera-
tions is based on a national approach, and not on coalition operations
198 Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action, p. 307.
199 Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army …”: 2–15.
200 Tucker and Lamb, “Restructuring Special Operations Forces …”: 1–6.
201 Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action, ch. 11.
202 Robert M. Cassidy, “The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Mili-
tary Culture”, Military Review, May–June (2005): 53–59.
Making New Ambitions Work 79seen for example in Iraq and Afghanistan today. A fair assumption is that
national strategies are more comprehensive than coalition strategies. 
This leads to a third question regarding future Norwegian Special
Operations Forces’ roles: If NORSOF is trained and equipped for indirect
capabilities aimed at low intensity operations, will this capability be uti-
lized effectively in a coalition framework? The US Special Operations
Forces community consists of more than 50,000 personnel, more than
double the size of the Norwegian Armed Forces in total. Using Minister
of Defense Strøm-Eriksen’s own words – would a NORSOF contribution
utilizing indirect force capabilities make a difference in a coalition con-
text? If capabilities do not exist, however, the chosen strategy is likely to
reflect this. 
Transforming NORSOF
In the final part of this chapter ideas about the transformation of NOR-
SOF will be presented. The underlying question is whether the current
organizational structure is inconsistent with future roles and missions. I
have earlier claimed that the challenge in the current transformation is
the lack of a framework to guide the process. Another challenge is that
Norway apparently can choose its future military engagements unless
NATO has been directly engaged by an external enemy (Article 5 opera-
tions). National engagements in Crisis Response Operations are first of all
based on their national interest. Technically, then, NORSOF must pos-
sess roles based on which conflicts Norway in the future defines as being
of particular national interest.203 Niche capabilities must then be devel-
oped according to this choice. They cannot be based exclusively on Alli-
ance requirements or topographical and climatic preferences as stated in
Relevant Force.204 A war on national territory will not require niche capa-
bilities; it would require a total effort from the Armed Forces, whether la-
beled “niche” or not. 
Factors Important to Transformation 
A major transformational principle for the Norwegian Armed Forces is
to maintain flexibility throughout the spectrum of tasks. Implicit to this
principle is also flexibility with regard to the spectrum of operations,
ranging from high intensity conventional war, to humanitarian opera-
tions and perhaps to nation building. Another principle is maintaining
203 See Preben Bonnén for an alternative view of Denmark’s choice of wars in the after-
math of the Cold War. Preben Bonnén, “Danmarks valg af krige og de indenrigspoli-
tiske konsekvenser af en aktiv udenrigspolitik” [the Danish Choice of Wars and
Consequences of an Active Foreign Policy], Norsk Militært Tidsskrift, no. 5 (2005):
11–15.
204 Forsvarsdepartementet, “Relevant Force”, p. 73.
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not have similar core capabilities. Since Norwegian Special Operations
Forces, by definition, are complementary to the conventional military,
the complementary factor will be discussed internally in NORSOF. Rel-
evance for NATO’s structure is a third factor which is important due to the
change of focus from national operations to international participation
via NATO or other coalition operations. Units exclusively designed for
national purposes will only exist to the degree that their capabilities are
unique to the defense of national territory. Such units will not be
trained or equipped to participate in out-of-area operations. A revital-
ized Home Guard exemplifies such a force element. Since the UN is in-
creasingly vitalized as an organ for future operations, I shall add the UN
to this factor.205 
According to Parliamentary Bill no. 42 (2003-2004), two additional
requirements are particular to NORSOF. The first is the requirement to
increase NORSOF’s general capability in order to improve “national freedom
of action, flexibility, and sustainability.”206 This increase is important to
fulfill NATO requirements as well. While this requirement could be as-
sociated with increased unit size, this study defines increased capability as
flexibility within the spectrum of special operations forces’ core tasks. Ideally, the
widest possible scope will enhance national freedom and flexibility, at
least in an international context. The second requirement is that HJK and
MJK should be able to conduct operations as a single unit or entity. NOR-
SOF interoperability is thus important. 
Future missions and roles are deemed to be the independent variable
in the following discussion while organizational structure is the depend-
ent variable. Table 8 summarizes the intervening variables deemed to be
important for future transformation.
Flexibility within the Spectrum of SOF Core Capabilities
In this study SOF core capabilities have been separated into direct action
and indirect action capabilities. In chapter 2 it was suggested that MJK
and HJK traditionally possess direct action capabilities. I also claim
service-specific capabilities, or domain, should be defined as core capabil-
ities. Domain separation has been the traditional separation of HJK and
205 Forsvarsdepartementet: Den videre moderniseringen av Forsvaret, p. 53.
206 Ibid., 56. Author’s translation.
Flexibility within the spectrum of special operations forces core capabilities
Complementary capabilities
Relevance for NATO and UN
NORSOF interoperability
Table 8: Factors pertaining to NORSOF transformation.
Making New Ambitions Work 81MJK, the domestic counterterrorism task excluded. In chapter 2 it was
also claimed that domain separation is diminished over time. To define
the actual degree of overlap could be a challenge and subject to percep-
tion. However, this is outside the scope of this study given its unclassified
nature. The factor flexibility can be illustrated according to Figure 7.
 
Figure 7: NORSOF current core capabilities.
Both units have repeatedly demonstrated proficiency within land warfare
(the Balkans and Afghanistan), but have never been put to test in naval
warfare scenarios. As this study has shown, however, both units have fo-
cused training and exercises according to their service affiliation.207 Both
units thus collectively represent capabilities within quadrant 1 and 2 of
Figure 7. This is the flexibility Norwegian Special Operations Forces are
assumed to represent today. The overlap is for illustrative purposes only,
but shows a degree of overlap.
Given that emerging conflicts will most likely occur at the lower end
of the intensity-scale, and that indirect action capabilities are preferred in
such conflicts, NORSOF represents a less flexible capability. Merging the
two units is not in itself likely to alter this situation. On the contrary,
merging the two units without specifying new roles is likely to diminish
existing capabilities within one of the domains because of organizational
207 Forsvarets overkommando, Forslag om samordning …
82 Defence and Security Studies 1-2007preferences, pending a new unit’s organizational location (Army or Navy).
Maintaining the status quo is therefore likely to be a better option if do-
main matters regardless of adding new capabilities. A merger is therefore
likely to reduce the existing capabilities, and thereby flexibility. 
The above discussion is only valid as long as a major objective is to
develop capabilities for international operations. Adding new capabilities
is not necessary to pursue national objectives alone. 
Complementary vs. Overlapping Capabilities
Given that the size and structure of the military at present are at what
Chief of Defense would claim to be a minimum, merging units with sim-
ilar capabilities is deemed necessary, first of all to maintain professional
qualities within the force itself. The argument is likely to evolve around
definitions of minimum size and the actual degree of overlap. 
There are currently no documents that can define ideal or minimum
unit size. There is a general idea, however, that a larger unit can engage
larger targets. Another assumption is that a larger unit has better endur-
ance than smaller units. To what degree these arguments are appropriate
is, however, unclear. The larger the unit, arguably the more conventional
it is.208 With regard to special operations, the general idea is to operate
with small teams to achieve objectives large conventional units cannot.
When the British attacked the German battleship Tirpitz in Altafjord in
1943, success in the final phase of the operation first of all hinged on the
attackers’ ability to remain undetected. By remaining undetected the at-
tackers achieved relative superiority, which again compensated for the in-
herent weakness of being outnumbered. Once detected, however, their
chances of success quickly diminished.209 The planners of the Tirpitz at-
tack were not dependent on a minimum-size organization to develop
their plan, train the operators, and execute the attack. They were, howev-
er, dependent of having the necessary priority and support from the mil-
itary organization as such. Assuming that NORSOF as a collective
organization is increased as a result of the last two defense reviews, merg-
ing for the sake of maintaining unit proficiency therefore seems less doc-
umented. 
The extent to which MJK and HJK traditionally possess similar ca-
pabilities is a matter of definition. It is, I would claim, the domain where
the operation takes place that constitutes the difference, not necessarily
the operation itself. As chapter 2 demonstrated, over time both units have
developed specific capabilities that traditionally belonged to the other
208 This argument is largely based on Henry Minzberg’s theories on behavior and man-
agement in organizations. From Richard L. Daft, Essentials of Organization Theory and
Design (Mason, OH: South-Western College Publishing, 2003). 
209 William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare (Novato, CA:
Presidio Press, 1995).
Making New Ambitions Work 83unit’s domain. It is therefore not unlikely that both units today possess
overlapping capabilities that justify a merger. More importantly, to the
extent that future capabilities should be duplicated, the rationale for
maintaining separate units seems weak.
Relevancy for NATO and UN Operations
As shown in chapter 2, both MJK and HJK are traditionally trained and
equipped for national defense purposes including NATO’s Article 5 sce-
nario. Non-Article 5 operations and UN missions are a fairly new focus,
at least for Norwegian Special Operations Forces. This leads in many ways
to the same discussion and conclusion as for flexibility within the spectrum of
special operations forces core capabilities.
A focus on direct action capabilities is ideal for NATO’s Response
Force concept. As stated earlier, NATO’s Response Force is primarily in-
tended to be a first in, first out capability. Hence, its focus should be on
Direct Action and surveillance-type missions. 
Focusing solely on direct action capabilities makes NORSOF less rel-
evant for non-article 5 and UN operations. Assuming the current NATO
mission in Afghanistan is representative of future types of conflicts, coun-
ter-insurgency capabilities supporting a counter-insurgency strategy are
in greater demand than the direct action focus. Without expanding its
current roles, NORSOF’s primary contribution will then be to support
conventional operations including direct action and intelligence collec-
tion. 
An important note should be that direct action and indirect action ca-
pabilities are not necessarily mutually exclusive in a given scenario. UN
operations require offensive as well as reconnaissance capabilities. The in-
tent is, however, to emphasize that core capabilities are most in demand.
The UN’s primary focus is to maintain impartiality to the belligerents. A
direct action focus seems thus less optimal as a generic capability for fu-
ture UN operations. 
To determine whether a merger is justified by the outcome of this fac-
tor, one has to go back to Tucker and Lamb who say both SOF core capa-
bilities are less likely to develop optimally within one single unit. This
factor therefore favors a status quo rather than a merger.
NORSOF Interoperability
In any organization, the level of interoperability is a function of subunits’
interdependence, i.e. “the extent to which departments depend on each
other for resources or materials to accomplish their tasks.”210 Co-locating
210 Thomson in Daft, Essentials of Organization …, p. 195.
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mutual communication, and when the level of coordination is deemed
high. Daily face-to-face interaction, teamwork, and quicker decision-
making are all benefits of increased closeness. A modern hospital illus-
trates a civilian organization where co-location of sub-units is both neces-
sary and desired.211 
A military task force exemplifies an organization requiring high lev-
els of communication and coordination to perform its main task. Run-
ning a civilian hospital is an example of an organization which in
principle has the same requirements. Whereas a hospital is permanently
located within a geographically confined area, and designed to repeat the
same tasks over time, a military organization is principally established to
solve a single mission, often unique, in an unspecified geographical area.
Its various task units are not organizationally merged beyond the imme-
diate mission. As missions change, so will the task organizations. 
Interoperability at the tactical level is primarily a concern in offensive
operations or raids. Tactics and procedures are therefore developed to en-
hance intra-team cooperation to counter or diminish interoperability is-
sues. MJK and HJK have both conducted joint operations internally as
well as with personnel or units from other nations. As long as teams are
not mixed beyond a minimum level, interoperability does not pose the
greatest challenge.212 The purpose of small unit tactics is to manage inter-
dependence in small teams, not in large formations. This might not be
optimal for individual missions or tasks, but it gives flexibility when
tasks are repeated in different settings.
One possible mission requiring a large formation is the national
counterterrorist task. Operations on maritime petroleum installations,
potentially involving hostages, are necessarily personnel intensive. On the
other hand, merging for the purpose of this task alone has not been an is-
sue until recently, indicating either that the existing national counter-
terrorism strategy is flawed, or that the threat has changed. 
To determine a merger on the basis of increased interoperability is
therefore not necessarily as obvious as it might seem. It is, however, log-
ical that the more the units are required to operate together, the more rea-
sonable it seems to merge. Where the separation line is, however, is less
clear. 
Conclusion and Implications: Strategic Merge?
The preceding discussion is summarized in table 9. The discussion is
based on a framework where special operations core capabilities are sepa-
rated by service-domain (Navy/Army) and direct/indirect action capabil-
211  Daft, Essentials of Organization …, p. 195.
212  Author’s personal experience.
Making New Ambitions Work 85ities as shown in figure 9. Maximum flexibility is achieved when all
quadrants are covered. Based on my analysis, NORSOF currently repre-
sents capabilities within quadrant 1 and 3, which represent direct action
capabilities in both the land and naval domain. By increasingly focusing
on the doctrinal task of Military Assistance, the spectrum of core capabil-
ities, hence NORSOF’s flexibility will increase. This flexibility can only
be achieved if current organizational structure is maintained. If not, a
merged unit will naturally focus on direct action capabilities. 
Table 9 ranks the four factors identified as important for current transfor-
mation. (+) indicates a merger of the existing units is more favorable, and
(-) indicates that a merger is less favorable 
According to this analysis, the factors spectrum of core capabilities and
relevancy for NATO and UN operations will suffer from a merger solu-
tion. If MJK and HJK do not develop separate roles and missions, they
are likely to represent similar capabilities and a merger is the most ef-
fective organizational design. Likewise, if interoperability require-
ments exceed an unspecified level, merging MJK and HJK seems more
prudent than not. 
The question is then whether one believes the service domain matters
or not, and whether Military Assistance is fundamentally different from
Direct Action and Special Surveillance and Reconnaissance as special operations
tasks.
Factors Merge
Spectrum of core capabilities -
Complementary capabilities +
Relevance for NATO and UN -
NORSOF interoperability +
Table 9: Factors and influence on organizational redesign (merge).
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Figure 8: Proposed separation of roles and missions.
Assuming that one accepts this model and the subsequent conclusion – to
maintain the current organization for maximum flexibility – the final
question becomes how to divide roles internal to NORSOF? I suggest a
division of roles as illustrated in Figure 8. Direct action capabilities
should remain MJK’s priority, while indirect action capabilities should
be assigned to HJK. Since neither task is mutually exclusive, overlapping
capabilities will continue to exist. Overlapping capabilities are necessary
for national purposes, and both units can act in a support/supportive func-
tion to each other. This is currently how the US SOF is organized to coun-
ter the ongoing insurgency in the southern Philippines. Here, US Army
Special Forces are leading the counterinsurgency effort supported by the
US SEAL teams.213
This suggestion is based on the fact that stabilization missions are the
domain of the army. It is the army that primarily performs the stabilizing
effort in Afghanistan and Iraq. It will be an army responsibility to stabi-
lize the Sudan conflict as well as other emerging conflicts. It therefore
seems logical to assign the Military Assistance task to the HJK. Likewise,
given Norway’s primary interests are connected to the maritime environ-
ment, maintaining proficiency within maritime special operations seems
213 According to LtCol Greg Wilson, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Wilson
is former Commanding Officer of US Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philip-
pines.
Making New Ambitions Work 87more prudent than not. HJK currently maintains this task. There is in
principle no reason why this task need to continue to be an army task, just
as it is not obvious to assign naval units for missions into the deserts of
Afghanistan.
This division of roles and missions would enhance national capability
across the spectrum of special operations, which was a goal in Parliamen-
tary Bill no. 42 (2003-2004). The division would also underscore and in-
crease NORSOF’s status as a niche capability in NATO. NORSOF future
roles and missions are illustrated in Figure 9, which separates national
from international roles, shows maritime and land warfare in a national
context, and distinguishes direct from indirect action in an international
context.
Figure 9: NORSOF future roles and missions separated on units.
There are clear challenges involved in this proposal. One challenge is that
indirect capabilities are not needed to defend the nation state. Without
having discussed the practical implications of introducing indirect capa-
bilities, there are clearly costs involved. Important factors to develop in-
direct action capabilities include increased focus on language training,
cultural knowledge, civil/military governance and so forth. These skills
are not acquired overnight. A fundamental question is whether Norway
wants to offer this capability as a niche to NATO and the UN?
A second challenge, arguably the biggest, is that indirect action
capabilities are necessary or useful only to the extent that the overall strat-
egy supports an indirect action approach as defined by Tucker and Lamb.
To “unilaterally” introduce this capability in a NATO framework is
therefore less prudent. NATO must, however, improve its strategy in Af-
ghanistan very soon, to include civil/military cooperation, or potentially
face a strategic defeat, as the Soviet did to the Taleban.
88 Defence and Security Studies 1-2007The hypothesis initially proposed was that current NORSOF organ-
izational structure is inconsistent with future missions and roles. As stat-
ed above, whether this is true or not depends first of all on national
strategic choices. The debate whether to merge or not is only relevant to
the extent these choices exist. As shown in the initial chapter, reorganiz-
ing NORSOF has been an issue of organizational design rather than op-
erational requirements. A more prudent approach would be to assess
future requirements in order to make the right strategic choices for future
transformation. 
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